- ANALYSIS
BY MICHAEL WAHID HANNA · JULY 13, 2015
To create a sustainable asymmetric structure will also require the normalization and stabilization of Baghdad-KRG ties, which remain strained despite interim arrangements to halt further deterioration.
As Joost Hiltermann points out, “Baghdad and Erbil are being pushed apart by the way one of the two main Kurdish parties has openly called for Kurdish independence (while the other has not excluded it), by unilateral moves in the disputed territories, and by an ongoing quarrel over oil and money.”[xvii]
For Iraq’s Kurds, the prospect of independence remains an ultimate goal, and many believed those hopes were buoyed by the territorial gains made in the wake of the collapse of the Iraqi security forces, particularly as much of those gains happened in disputed territories such as the symbolically potent city of Kirkuk.
~~~
But this popular reading of trends is misplaced.In fact, for the first time since the era of Saddam Hussein, the security of the KRG has come under serious threat.
As Cale Salih points out, due to “the very real danger ISIS poses to Kurdistan, the complexity of the Kirkuk question, the economic calculations of the KRG and the regional and international context.”[xviii]
Perhaps most significantly, Turkey, which has unexpectedly constructed positive relations with Iraq’s Kurds despite prolonged antagonisms, has come out clearly against the prospects of Iraqi Kurdish independence.[xix]
To institutionalize and safeguard their autonomy, the KRG will have to eschew ad hoc dispensations and seek a more stable and enduring political settlement with Baghdad. This will require a permanent agreement on oil management and revenue sharing, which would “cement an equitable economic relationship between the central government and its Kurdish counterpart…. [and] provide the Kurds with the tools they need to build up the region under their own direction, and allow it to flourish.”[xx]
It will also require a willingness not to rely on territorial conquest as a means of resolving the open question on disputed internal boundaries; such an approach will ensure renewed future political and potentially military conflict with Baghdad.
Finally, and in tension with Iraqi Kurdish aspirations, the KRG should “work to strengthen the Iraqi state as a way of protecting its region from outside attack,” as “[o]nly a state capable of exercising full control over both Shiite and Sunni areas can provide security guarantees to the Kurds.”[xxi]
The need for a broad accommodation on decentralization remains acute and as IS loses momentum in Iraq, the need for robust planning for post-IS governance in liberated territories gains greater urgency and would boost the prospects for both the immediate military campaign against IS and other rejectionists, and the longer-term viability of Iraq.
An asymmetric outcome would also most accurately reflect the existing realities of the country. It would be best accomplished through constitutional revision, but the unlikelihood of that occurring suggests that the most constructive way forward would be through legislative action.
Such efforts at legislative reform have failed previously in producing functional outcomes, but must again be attempted despite the even more challenging backdrop.
Syria’s Indefinite Strategic Stalemate
The prospects for decentralization in Syria are made more challenging by the protracted nature of the Syrian civil war and the near certainty that the military conflict will continue for years to come.
As Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur highlight, “[t]he Syrian regime’s militarization of the conflict and the subsequent escalation of the fighting, fueled by a multitude of actors, have set Syrians’ sights even more narrowly on their regions.”[xxii]
This loosening of binding ties between the center and opposition-held territory suggests that any eventual political settlement to end the fighting will require some form and degree of meaningful decentralization.
All sides in the Syrian conflict suffer from exhaustion and manpower limitations that undermine the ability of any faction or alignment of factions to end the war militarily.
The intervention by U.S.-led military forces against IS has also had a much more limited impact in Syria than Iraq due to the lack of effective coordination with suitable ground forces.
The prospects for major shifts in U.S. Syria policy remain unlikely for the remainder of the Obama administration. Coupled with the lack of serious international diplomatic efforts and the continued unwillingness of the Assad regime to negotiate in good faith, there is no reason for optimism over the trajectory of future conflict in Syria.
Without a meaningful resource base, and following the destruction of its industrial backbone, no future central government in Damascus will be in a position to easily bring outlying areas under its administrative orbit.
This fiscal distress is further exacerbated by new patterns of patronage to satisfy constituencies, such as local militia forces, that have arisen and matured during war-time. These more recent trends build upon longstanding and chronic neglect of rural areas.
Furthermore, with an inconclusive military conflict and intense enmities and suspicions as a backdrop, it is difficult to imagine the basis upon which a central state could be successfully reconstructed.
Similarly, the unlikelihood of regime change suggests that an Alawite-led central state will endure, although in a truncated form. In such circumstances, formalizing decentralization would offer future protection against the depredations of the central government for the country’s aggrieved majority Sunni population.
Properly crafted localized forms of administration could also offer protection to concentrated segments of the country’s extensive and vulnerable minority population. Such steps are unlikely to fuel further fragmentation or inspire secessionist intent as a result of the resiliency of Syrian national identity.
This is not to suggest uniform notions of Syrian nationalism. In fact, “in contemporary Syria, a central function of national identity for both regime supporters and the opposition is to create a bridge between otherwise unlike groups and to wall off one’s opponents as traitors (takhwin).”[xxiii]
This is testament to the fact that while protracted conflict has fundamentally altered the country’s social fabric, it has still not resulted in the creation of secessionist movements. Nationalism remains a framing mechanism for legitimacy.
The fragmentation of the country has largely evolved in relation to the military conflict, but there are constituencies within Syria who see decentralization as a possible pathway to sustainable politics.
Chief among these groups are Syria’s Kurds, who have never fully integrated into the opposition movement for a variety of reasons and continue to face state hostility and opposition to their efforts for autonomy.
Speaking in 2012, Abdul-Hakim Bashar, the president of the Kurdish National Council of Syria, advocated for political decentralization, arguing that “a decentralized political system reassures all parties in Syrian society that the future will be to their liking.”[xxiv]
While lacking international backing or a hospitable legal environment upon which to pursue autonomy, in contrast to the situation of Iraqi Kurds, Syria’s Kurds have carved out areas of de facto autonomy.
For most other fighting factions, the prospect of negotiation has been so remote and secondary to the all-encompassing military fight that systematic and focused attention to preferred governance structures and frameworks has been far from paramount.
However, the reality of enduring de facto fragmentation and the lack of mainstream secessionist intent suggest that Syria’s future will likely depend on accommodating the country’s radically altered shape. Some analysts have suggested that the Syrian regime has also come to a related conclusion.
David W. Lesch suggested in 2014 that Syrian regime officials “see decentralization as a strategic necessity. For them, it is the best way for components of the regime to ensure at least some modicum of power and status in the future.
The regime has neither the manpower nor money — much less the legitimacy or credibility — to reassert anywhere close to the authority it once enjoyed over the territories it has lost, and even over much of what it nominally controls.”[xxv]
Despite the obvious bad faith of the Assad regime, this observation again points to the difficulties in reconstructing a strong centralized state.
In the interim, while political negotiations aimed at bridging the gap between the Assad regime and the opposition writ large should be pursued if the opportunity arises, this longer-term effort should not come at the expense of bottom-up efforts to reinforce local and sub-national administration and governance.
More static conflict and stable lines of territorial control represent the upper limit of achievable medium-term goals. Opportunities to reinforce local actors will be limited by the specter of IS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other Salafi jihadi actors and the ever-present menace of regime airpower, but opportunities should be actively pursued and presented as both a precedent and an incentive.
Conclusion
While the reality of fragmentation is well underway in Iraq and Syria, the process of establishing a sustainable political settlement and eventual reconciliation will evolve in radically different settings and on significantly divergent timelines.
Central to any such efforts in either country will be decentralization, which represents an important tool that accommodates the reality and legacy of ethno-sectarian conflict without succumbing to the reductive logic of demographic determinism.
In contrast, with limited organic support, partition represents a needlessly radical and untenable approach to crisis management. As such, outside actors should aggressively pursue diplomatic openings presented by the fragmented reality of the present. It is through such sub-national arrangements and devolved autonomy that sustainable outcomes might emerge.
Michael Wahid Hanna is a senior fellow at The Century Foundation. He works on issues of international security, international law, and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and South Asia.
He has published widely on U.S. foreign policy in newspapers and journals, including articles in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor, the New Republic, Democracy, Middle East Report, and World Policy Journal, among other publications, and is a frequent contributor to Foreign Policy.
He appears regularly on MSNBC, PBS, BBC, NPR and al-Jazeera, including appearances on the Charlie Rose Show and UP with Steve Kornacki. He served as a consultant for Human Rights Watch in Baghdad in 2008.
Prior to joining The Century Foundation, Hanna was a senior fellow at the International Human Rights Law Institute. From 1999 to 2004, Hanna practiced corporate law with the New York law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton.
Fluent in Arabic, he was a Fulbright Scholar at Cairo University. He received a J.D. from New York University School of Law, where he was an editor of the Law Review. Hanna is a term-member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Citations
[i] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), “Decentralization in Unitary States: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa” (2014): 14.
[ii] International IDEA, 14.
[iii] Robin Wright, “Imagining a Remapped Middle East,” The New York Times, September 28, 2013, http://ift.tt/1RVZTmC
[iv] Zeinobia, “Regarding the NYTimes Map Dividing 5 Arab Countries in to 14,” Egyptian Chronicles Blog, October 1, 2013,http://ift.tt/1RVZTmH; Michael Collins Dunn, “Egyptian Xenophobia and the Misreading of Robin Wright’s Map,” Middle East Institute Editor’s Blog, October 2, 2013, http://ift.tt/1GIAi4O.
[v] “South Sudan and the Arab World: A Plot to do Down Islam,” The Economist, January 13, 2011,http://ift.tt/1GIAi4P (“Through the lens of the Muslim Brotherhood’s slick Arabic-language website, the referendum on the future of South Sudan looks rather different from its portrayal elsewhere. The looming partition of Sudan is not, it says, the logical outcome of five decades of civil war. It is the fruition of a century-old Western ecclesiastical plot to close Islam’s gateway into Africa, and the start of a plan to break other Arab countries into feeble statelets so as to grab their riches.”).
[vi] Reidar Visser, “Proto-Political Conceptions of ‘Iraq’ in Late Ottoman Times,” International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 3 (2009): 143; Fanar Haddad, “The Terrorists of Today are the Heroes of Tomorrow: The Anti-British and Anti-American Insurgencies in Iraqi History,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19 (2008): 451; Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur, “The Struggle for Syria’s Regions,” Middle East Report 43 (2013), http://ift.tt/1z82rRy.
[vii] Syria Justice and Accountability Center, Craig Charney, “Maybe We Can Reach a Solution: Syrian Perspectives on the Conflict and Local Initiatives for Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation” (2015)http://ift.tt/1GIAilg.
[viii] Syria Justice and Accountability Center, http://ift.tt/1GIAl0f
[ix] Joost Hiltermann, Sean Kane, and Raad Alkadiri, “Iraq’s Federalism Quandary,” The National Interest, February 28, 2012,http://ift.tt/1GIAl0l.
[x] Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri, “Iraq’s Federalism Quandary.”
[xi] Douglas A. Ollivant, “Iraq Will Continue to Need a Strong Central Government,” Al Jazeera America, January 16, 2015,http://ift.tt/1yYueWS.
[xii] Ibid
[xiii] Ibid
[xiv] Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri, “Iraq’s Federalism Quandary.”
[xv] Ibid
[xvi] Douglas A. Ollivant, “Iraq After the Islamic State: Politics Rule” War on the Rocks, February 18, 2015http://ift.tt/1AHkwun.
[xvii] Joost Hiltermann, “Clearing the Landmines from Iraqi Kurdistan’s Future,” International Crisis Group In Pursuit of Peace Blog, March 24, 2015, http://ift.tt/1RVZTDd.
[xviii] Cale Salih, “Kurdistan ISn’t About to Leave Iraq Amid ISIS Fighting” TIME, August 6, 2014,http://ift.tt/1swoiiL.
[xix] “Turkish premier says a Kurdish state would ‘endanger the region’” Rudaw, January 14, 2015,http://ift.tt/1RVZTTs.
[xx] Hiltermann, “Clearing the Landmines from Iraqi Kurdistan’s Future.”
[xxi] Ibid
[xxii] Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur, “The Struggle for Syria’s Regions.”
[xxiii] Ibid
[xxiv] “Kurdish Syrian Council: Key to Stability is Decentralization,” Al-Monitor, May, 23, 2012 http://ift.tt/1RVZRep.
[xxv] David W. Lesch, “A Path to Peace in Syria” Foreign Policy, July 2, 2014 http://ift.tt/1GIAiS5.
http://ift.tt/1RRMewJ
As Cale Salih points out, due to “the very real danger ISIS poses to Kurdistan, the complexity of the Kirkuk question, the economic calculations of the KRG and the regional and international context.”[xviii]
Perhaps most significantly, Turkey, which has unexpectedly constructed positive relations with Iraq’s Kurds despite prolonged antagonisms, has come out clearly against the prospects of Iraqi Kurdish independence.[xix]
To institutionalize and safeguard their autonomy, the KRG will have to eschew ad hoc dispensations and seek a more stable and enduring political settlement with Baghdad. This will require a permanent agreement on oil management and revenue sharing, which would “cement an equitable economic relationship between the central government and its Kurdish counterpart…. [and] provide the Kurds with the tools they need to build up the region under their own direction, and allow it to flourish.”[xx]
It will also require a willingness not to rely on territorial conquest as a means of resolving the open question on disputed internal boundaries; such an approach will ensure renewed future political and potentially military conflict with Baghdad.
Finally, and in tension with Iraqi Kurdish aspirations, the KRG should “work to strengthen the Iraqi state as a way of protecting its region from outside attack,” as “[o]nly a state capable of exercising full control over both Shiite and Sunni areas can provide security guarantees to the Kurds.”[xxi]
The need for a broad accommodation on decentralization remains acute and as IS loses momentum in Iraq, the need for robust planning for post-IS governance in liberated territories gains greater urgency and would boost the prospects for both the immediate military campaign against IS and other rejectionists, and the longer-term viability of Iraq.
An asymmetric outcome would also most accurately reflect the existing realities of the country. It would be best accomplished through constitutional revision, but the unlikelihood of that occurring suggests that the most constructive way forward would be through legislative action.
Such efforts at legislative reform have failed previously in producing functional outcomes, but must again be attempted despite the even more challenging backdrop.
Syria’s Indefinite Strategic Stalemate
The prospects for decentralization in Syria are made more challenging by the protracted nature of the Syrian civil war and the near certainty that the military conflict will continue for years to come.
As Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur highlight, “[t]he Syrian regime’s militarization of the conflict and the subsequent escalation of the fighting, fueled by a multitude of actors, have set Syrians’ sights even more narrowly on their regions.”[xxii]
This loosening of binding ties between the center and opposition-held territory suggests that any eventual political settlement to end the fighting will require some form and degree of meaningful decentralization.
All sides in the Syrian conflict suffer from exhaustion and manpower limitations that undermine the ability of any faction or alignment of factions to end the war militarily.
The intervention by U.S.-led military forces against IS has also had a much more limited impact in Syria than Iraq due to the lack of effective coordination with suitable ground forces.
The prospects for major shifts in U.S. Syria policy remain unlikely for the remainder of the Obama administration. Coupled with the lack of serious international diplomatic efforts and the continued unwillingness of the Assad regime to negotiate in good faith, there is no reason for optimism over the trajectory of future conflict in Syria.
Without a meaningful resource base, and following the destruction of its industrial backbone, no future central government in Damascus will be in a position to easily bring outlying areas under its administrative orbit.
This fiscal distress is further exacerbated by new patterns of patronage to satisfy constituencies, such as local militia forces, that have arisen and matured during war-time. These more recent trends build upon longstanding and chronic neglect of rural areas.
Furthermore, with an inconclusive military conflict and intense enmities and suspicions as a backdrop, it is difficult to imagine the basis upon which a central state could be successfully reconstructed.
Similarly, the unlikelihood of regime change suggests that an Alawite-led central state will endure, although in a truncated form. In such circumstances, formalizing decentralization would offer future protection against the depredations of the central government for the country’s aggrieved majority Sunni population.
Properly crafted localized forms of administration could also offer protection to concentrated segments of the country’s extensive and vulnerable minority population. Such steps are unlikely to fuel further fragmentation or inspire secessionist intent as a result of the resiliency of Syrian national identity.
This is not to suggest uniform notions of Syrian nationalism. In fact, “in contemporary Syria, a central function of national identity for both regime supporters and the opposition is to create a bridge between otherwise unlike groups and to wall off one’s opponents as traitors (takhwin).”[xxiii]
This is testament to the fact that while protracted conflict has fundamentally altered the country’s social fabric, it has still not resulted in the creation of secessionist movements. Nationalism remains a framing mechanism for legitimacy.
The fragmentation of the country has largely evolved in relation to the military conflict, but there are constituencies within Syria who see decentralization as a possible pathway to sustainable politics.
Chief among these groups are Syria’s Kurds, who have never fully integrated into the opposition movement for a variety of reasons and continue to face state hostility and opposition to their efforts for autonomy.
Speaking in 2012, Abdul-Hakim Bashar, the president of the Kurdish National Council of Syria, advocated for political decentralization, arguing that “a decentralized political system reassures all parties in Syrian society that the future will be to their liking.”[xxiv]
While lacking international backing or a hospitable legal environment upon which to pursue autonomy, in contrast to the situation of Iraqi Kurds, Syria’s Kurds have carved out areas of de facto autonomy.
For most other fighting factions, the prospect of negotiation has been so remote and secondary to the all-encompassing military fight that systematic and focused attention to preferred governance structures and frameworks has been far from paramount.
However, the reality of enduring de facto fragmentation and the lack of mainstream secessionist intent suggest that Syria’s future will likely depend on accommodating the country’s radically altered shape. Some analysts have suggested that the Syrian regime has also come to a related conclusion.
David W. Lesch suggested in 2014 that Syrian regime officials “see decentralization as a strategic necessity. For them, it is the best way for components of the regime to ensure at least some modicum of power and status in the future.
The regime has neither the manpower nor money — much less the legitimacy or credibility — to reassert anywhere close to the authority it once enjoyed over the territories it has lost, and even over much of what it nominally controls.”[xxv]
Despite the obvious bad faith of the Assad regime, this observation again points to the difficulties in reconstructing a strong centralized state.
In the interim, while political negotiations aimed at bridging the gap between the Assad regime and the opposition writ large should be pursued if the opportunity arises, this longer-term effort should not come at the expense of bottom-up efforts to reinforce local and sub-national administration and governance.
More static conflict and stable lines of territorial control represent the upper limit of achievable medium-term goals. Opportunities to reinforce local actors will be limited by the specter of IS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other Salafi jihadi actors and the ever-present menace of regime airpower, but opportunities should be actively pursued and presented as both a precedent and an incentive.
Conclusion
While the reality of fragmentation is well underway in Iraq and Syria, the process of establishing a sustainable political settlement and eventual reconciliation will evolve in radically different settings and on significantly divergent timelines.
Central to any such efforts in either country will be decentralization, which represents an important tool that accommodates the reality and legacy of ethno-sectarian conflict without succumbing to the reductive logic of demographic determinism.
In contrast, with limited organic support, partition represents a needlessly radical and untenable approach to crisis management. As such, outside actors should aggressively pursue diplomatic openings presented by the fragmented reality of the present. It is through such sub-national arrangements and devolved autonomy that sustainable outcomes might emerge.
Michael Wahid Hanna is a senior fellow at The Century Foundation. He works on issues of international security, international law, and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and South Asia.
He has published widely on U.S. foreign policy in newspapers and journals, including articles in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor, the New Republic, Democracy, Middle East Report, and World Policy Journal, among other publications, and is a frequent contributor to Foreign Policy.
He appears regularly on MSNBC, PBS, BBC, NPR and al-Jazeera, including appearances on the Charlie Rose Show and UP with Steve Kornacki. He served as a consultant for Human Rights Watch in Baghdad in 2008.
Prior to joining The Century Foundation, Hanna was a senior fellow at the International Human Rights Law Institute. From 1999 to 2004, Hanna practiced corporate law with the New York law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton.
Fluent in Arabic, he was a Fulbright Scholar at Cairo University. He received a J.D. from New York University School of Law, where he was an editor of the Law Review. Hanna is a term-member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Citations
[i] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), “Decentralization in Unitary States: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa” (2014): 14.
[ii] International IDEA, 14.
[iii] Robin Wright, “Imagining a Remapped Middle East,” The New York Times, September 28, 2013, http://ift.tt/1RVZTmC
[iv] Zeinobia, “Regarding the NYTimes Map Dividing 5 Arab Countries in to 14,” Egyptian Chronicles Blog, October 1, 2013,http://ift.tt/1RVZTmH; Michael Collins Dunn, “Egyptian Xenophobia and the Misreading of Robin Wright’s Map,” Middle East Institute Editor’s Blog, October 2, 2013, http://ift.tt/1GIAi4O.
[v] “South Sudan and the Arab World: A Plot to do Down Islam,” The Economist, January 13, 2011,http://ift.tt/1GIAi4P (“Through the lens of the Muslim Brotherhood’s slick Arabic-language website, the referendum on the future of South Sudan looks rather different from its portrayal elsewhere. The looming partition of Sudan is not, it says, the logical outcome of five decades of civil war. It is the fruition of a century-old Western ecclesiastical plot to close Islam’s gateway into Africa, and the start of a plan to break other Arab countries into feeble statelets so as to grab their riches.”).
[vi] Reidar Visser, “Proto-Political Conceptions of ‘Iraq’ in Late Ottoman Times,” International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 3 (2009): 143; Fanar Haddad, “The Terrorists of Today are the Heroes of Tomorrow: The Anti-British and Anti-American Insurgencies in Iraqi History,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19 (2008): 451; Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur, “The Struggle for Syria’s Regions,” Middle East Report 43 (2013), http://ift.tt/1z82rRy.
[vii] Syria Justice and Accountability Center, Craig Charney, “Maybe We Can Reach a Solution: Syrian Perspectives on the Conflict and Local Initiatives for Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation” (2015)http://ift.tt/1GIAilg.
[viii] Syria Justice and Accountability Center, http://ift.tt/1GIAl0f
[ix] Joost Hiltermann, Sean Kane, and Raad Alkadiri, “Iraq’s Federalism Quandary,” The National Interest, February 28, 2012,http://ift.tt/1GIAl0l.
[x] Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri, “Iraq’s Federalism Quandary.”
[xi] Douglas A. Ollivant, “Iraq Will Continue to Need a Strong Central Government,” Al Jazeera America, January 16, 2015,http://ift.tt/1yYueWS.
[xii] Ibid
[xiii] Ibid
[xiv] Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri, “Iraq’s Federalism Quandary.”
[xv] Ibid
[xvi] Douglas A. Ollivant, “Iraq After the Islamic State: Politics Rule” War on the Rocks, February 18, 2015http://ift.tt/1AHkwun.
[xvii] Joost Hiltermann, “Clearing the Landmines from Iraqi Kurdistan’s Future,” International Crisis Group In Pursuit of Peace Blog, March 24, 2015, http://ift.tt/1RVZTDd.
[xviii] Cale Salih, “Kurdistan ISn’t About to Leave Iraq Amid ISIS Fighting” TIME, August 6, 2014,http://ift.tt/1swoiiL.
[xix] “Turkish premier says a Kurdish state would ‘endanger the region’” Rudaw, January 14, 2015,http://ift.tt/1RVZTTs.
[xx] Hiltermann, “Clearing the Landmines from Iraqi Kurdistan’s Future.”
[xxi] Ibid
[xxii] Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur, “The Struggle for Syria’s Regions.”
[xxiii] Ibid
[xxiv] “Kurdish Syrian Council: Key to Stability is Decentralization,” Al-Monitor, May, 23, 2012 http://ift.tt/1RVZRep.
[xxv] David W. Lesch, “A Path to Peace in Syria” Foreign Policy, July 2, 2014 http://ift.tt/1GIAiS5.
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