Post From Wealthwatch.world Chat Room 7-22-15 Evening Part 1 of 2
chattels: I encourage all to read the fuller version and I apologize for the long post in the chat, but the insight and commentary provided by this essay are very important, IMO
chattels: wealthwatch.world/showthr...
http://ift.tt/1KlV0MF
chattels: ‹@EdoBini› Abadi is the closest to a statesman that may exist in Iraq and far superior to Mr. Maliki, eh ?
chattels: decentralization is already formally underway in Iraq and is taking place within a constitutional framework. The exact parameters of the accommodation between Baghdad and Iraq’s regions, however, remain contentious and unresolved. Iraq’s flawed 2005 constitution itself reflects Iraq’s underlying and ongoing political and identity crises.
~~~
chattels: I encourage all to read the fuller version and I apologize for the long post in the chat, but the insight and commentary provided by this essay are very important, IMO
chattels: wealthwatch.world/showthr...
http://ift.tt/1KlV0MF
chattels: ‹@EdoBini› Abadi is the closest to a statesman that may exist in Iraq and far superior to Mr. Maliki, eh ?
chattels: decentralization is already formally underway in Iraq and is taking place within a constitutional framework. The exact parameters of the accommodation between Baghdad and Iraq’s regions, however, remain contentious and unresolved. Iraq’s flawed 2005 constitution itself reflects Iraq’s underlying and ongoing political and identity crises.
~~~
Based on Iraq’s recent experience and “given the strong association between federalism and the Kurds’ ultimate desire for statehood, almost any exploration of greater local autonomy by the provinces raises suspicions of a partitionist agenda.”[ix]
To move beyond this current impasse, any enduring dispensation will have to contend with the reality and irreversibility of Kurdish autonomy while understanding the undesirability of formalizing similar ethno-sectarian arrangements for other parts of the country.
chattels: The politics of decentralization in Iraq have changed dramatically since the country adopted its constitution.
While Sunni-majority regions in Iraq have more recently come to see the potential benefits of decentralization, Iraq’s Sunni Arab political leaders were previously opposed to any forms of decentralization.
The psychology underlying this rejection was complex, bound up with the intractable disputes regarding territorial boundaries with the Kurds and the difficulty in accommodating to the demographic and political reality of a Shia-led political order.
Simply put, important strands among Iraq’s Sunnis had grown accustomed to ruling Iraq from the center and were not yet ready to concede that future prize. Incidentally, this same rejectionist attitude continues to be an animating rationale for IS and its recruitment.
Conversely, “during the writing of the 2005 constitution—a period of intense civil strife—a powerful group of Shia Islamists openly championed the Kurdish-inspired model of ethno-sectarian federalism as a hedge against the return of a Sunni strongman such as Saddam Hussein.”[x]
In the ensuing years, that model of ethno-sectarian federalism has never gained widespread traction beyond the KRG, but many of Iraq’s Sunni political leaders have come to see decentralization as a buffer between Sunni-majority areas and a Shia-led central state.
This process accelerated after the U.S. withdrawal and as power was increasingly concentrated in the person of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
EdoBini: Yes !!!! better than Maliki by far but not certainly the best Iraq could provide at this time in their History.
chattels: ‹@EdoBini› Who do you have in mind ?
chattels: there is an inherent tension in the push for greater decentralization by Iraq’s Kurds and Sunnis: “On the one hand, they want a Baghdad that cedes power, one that is weak enough not to interfere with their regional arrangements.
On the other hand, they also want a strong Baghdad, one that has the ability to pull oil revenue from Basra province (the source of about 80 percent of Iraq’s oil income) and distribute it throughout the country.”[xi]
As he further explains, “oil nationalism is the fundamental arrangement underlying the Iraqi state.”[xii]
This redistributive model and the inequitable geographic dispersion of natural resources will create a formidable check against separatist ambitions among the Kurds and the drive for greater autonomy on the part of Sunni-majority provinces.
This check is further strengthened by the utter devastation that has been wrought in many of the country’s Sunni-majority areas, a devastation that has only accelerated in the wake of IS’s military campaign, territorial acquisition, and persistent terrorism.
The centrality of oil to this arrangement means that “a relatively equitable distribution of this wealth will be key to future stability,” but this “will also require a relatively strong Baghdad.”[xiii]
This suggests that full implementation of the constitutional arrangements for decentralization would prove unworkable and counterproductive in practice; countrywide regionalization, including Basra and the South would likely set in motion powerful interests and forces that would undercut the economic viability of the Iraqi state.
But it is also clear that the current political order is unable to provide equitable and fair governance to all its citizens. While claims that Sunni marginalization is the prime driver of the rise of IS are misguided and hyperbolic, it is undoubtedly true that Iraq’s Sunni citizens have legitimate grievances based on the actions of Baghdad.
chattels: In this light, “a system of asymmetric federalism may be the most practical solution for the problems that Iraq faces because it most accurately reflects the country’s enduring ethnic and political realities.”[xiv]
In this case, an asymmetric outcome would recognize the special status of the KRG while allowing for further and necessary decentralization in other parts of the country.
As Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri further highlight, “no other model is likely to enable the country to reach an acceptable solution for Kurdistan while at the same time ensuring that the central government in Baghdad is viable enough to function.”[xv]
chattels: Reaching a settlement along these lines previously eluded Iraq’s political class, even at a time of decreasing violence and instability.
With the rise of IS and the loss of significant territory to that group, sectarian and ethnic polarization, and the further deterioration of trust among communities, have undermined the prospects for reaching such an accommodation.
Nonetheless, the instability of the current juncture renders such political steps imperative. The most immediate concern in this regard is bound up with the institutionalization of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the manner in which the central government interacts with and supports such local forces in Sunni-majority areas in the future.
The complex dynamics undergirding this issue can be seen in microcosm in the approach of Iraq’s political factions to the legislative issue of a National Guard force, which is understood by Sunnis as a necessary step for challenging IS and liberating IS-controlled territory in Sunni-majority areas.
Perhaps most importantly for Iraq’s Sunnis, the PMF issue will go a long way in determining whether the community can have any confidence in functional decentralization.
That confidence will be dependent on whether the central government can allow for provincial-level control of PMFs while properly and proportionately resourcing those forces.
In return, provincial leaders will have to allow the central government an oversight and collaborative role.
The precedent established by the PMF issue will have a disproportionate role in clarifying the political incentives for many Sunni leaders, and a positive resolution could encourage the mobilization of a critical mass of Sunni fighters, who will be indispensable in degrading IS military power and reach.
These steps would alter Iraq’s polarized sectarian political and security dynamics.
chattels: It remains the case that the PMF issue will serve as a litmus test for the willingness and ability of Iraq’s political class to cobble together a practicable resolution that incentivizes cooperation between Baghdad and the provinces. Further afield, successful decentralization in Sunni-majority areas of Iraq could provide a model for such efforts in Syria.
chattels: To create a sustainable asymmetric structure will also require the normalization and stabilization of Baghdad-KRG ties, which remain strained despite interim arrangements to halt further deterioration.
As Joost Hiltermann points out, “Baghdad and Erbil are being pushed apart by the way one of the two main Kurdish parties has openly called for Kurdish independence (while the other has not excluded it), by unilateral moves in the disputed territories, and by an ongoing quarrel over oil and money.”[xvii]
For Iraq’s Kurds, the prospect of independence remains an ultimate goal, and many believed those hopes were buoyed by the territorial gains made in the wake of the collapse of the Iraqi security forces, particularly as much of those gains happened in disputed territories such as the symbolically potent city of Kirkuk.
chattels: The need for a broad accommodation on decentralization remains acute and as IS loses momentum in Iraq, the need for robust planning for post-IS governance in liberated territories gains greater urgency and would boost the prospects for both the immediate military campaign against IS and other rejectionists, and the longer-term viability of Iraq.
An asymmetric outcome would also most accurately reflect the existing realities of the country.
It would be best accomplished through constitutional revision, but the unlikelihood of that occurring suggests that the most constructive way forward would be through legislative action.
Such efforts at legislative reform have failed previously in producing functional outcomes, but must again be attempted despite the even more challenging backdrop.
chattels: I encourage all to read the fuller version and I apologize for the long post in the chat, but the insight and commentary provided by this essay are very important, IMO
chattels: Asymmetric federalism or asymmetrical federalism is found in a federation or confederation in which different constituent states possess different powers: one or more of the states has considerably more autonomy than the other substates, although they have the same constitutional status. The division of powers between substates is not symmetric.
This is in contrast to symmetric federalism, where no distinction is made between constituent states.
As a result, it is frequently proposed as a solution to the dissatisfactions that arise when one or two constituent units feel significantly different needs from the others, as the result of an ethnic, linguistic or cultural difference.
The difference between an asymmetric federation and federacy is indistinct; a federacy is essentially an extreme case of an asymmetric federation, either due to large differences in the level of autonomy, or the rigidity of the constitutional arrangements.
An asymmetric federation however has to have a federal constitution and all states in federation have the same formal status ("state"), while in a federacy independent substate has a different status ("autonomous region").
[04:50:36 PM] chattels: http://ift.tt/1VxDLy2...
http://ift.tt/1KlV3bj
chattels: fed·er·a·cy ˈfed(ə)rəsē/Submit noun a group of states with a central government but independence in internal affairs; a federation. the state of being joined by a treaty.
chattels: www.google.com/webhp
http://ift.tt/1VxDLy7
chattels: By definition the difference between a confederation and a federation is that the membership of the member states in a confederation is voluntary, while the membership in a federation is not.
chattels: http://ift.tt/1VxDJpY...
http://ift.tt/1DoM4o8
chattels: there is an inherent tension in the push for greater decentralization by Iraq’s Kurds and Sunnis: “On the one hand, they want a Baghdad that cedes power, one that is weak enough not to interfere with their regional arrangements.
On the other hand, they also want a strong Baghdad, one that has the ability to pull oil revenue from Basra province (the source of about 80 percent of Iraq’s oil income) and distribute it throughout the country.”[xi]
As he further explains, “oil nationalism is the fundamental arrangement underlying the Iraqi state.”[xii]
This redistributive model and the inequitable geographic dispersion of natural resources will create a formidable check against separatist ambitions among the Kurds and the drive for greater autonomy on the part of Sunni-majority provinces.
To move beyond this current impasse, any enduring dispensation will have to contend with the reality and irreversibility of Kurdish autonomy while understanding the undesirability of formalizing similar ethno-sectarian arrangements for other parts of the country.
chattels: The politics of decentralization in Iraq have changed dramatically since the country adopted its constitution.
While Sunni-majority regions in Iraq have more recently come to see the potential benefits of decentralization, Iraq’s Sunni Arab political leaders were previously opposed to any forms of decentralization.
The psychology underlying this rejection was complex, bound up with the intractable disputes regarding territorial boundaries with the Kurds and the difficulty in accommodating to the demographic and political reality of a Shia-led political order.
Simply put, important strands among Iraq’s Sunnis had grown accustomed to ruling Iraq from the center and were not yet ready to concede that future prize. Incidentally, this same rejectionist attitude continues to be an animating rationale for IS and its recruitment.
Conversely, “during the writing of the 2005 constitution—a period of intense civil strife—a powerful group of Shia Islamists openly championed the Kurdish-inspired model of ethno-sectarian federalism as a hedge against the return of a Sunni strongman such as Saddam Hussein.”[x]
In the ensuing years, that model of ethno-sectarian federalism has never gained widespread traction beyond the KRG, but many of Iraq’s Sunni political leaders have come to see decentralization as a buffer between Sunni-majority areas and a Shia-led central state.
This process accelerated after the U.S. withdrawal and as power was increasingly concentrated in the person of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
EdoBini: Yes !!!! better than Maliki by far but not certainly the best Iraq could provide at this time in their History.
chattels: ‹@EdoBini› Who do you have in mind ?
chattels: there is an inherent tension in the push for greater decentralization by Iraq’s Kurds and Sunnis: “On the one hand, they want a Baghdad that cedes power, one that is weak enough not to interfere with their regional arrangements.
On the other hand, they also want a strong Baghdad, one that has the ability to pull oil revenue from Basra province (the source of about 80 percent of Iraq’s oil income) and distribute it throughout the country.”[xi]
As he further explains, “oil nationalism is the fundamental arrangement underlying the Iraqi state.”[xii]
This redistributive model and the inequitable geographic dispersion of natural resources will create a formidable check against separatist ambitions among the Kurds and the drive for greater autonomy on the part of Sunni-majority provinces.
This check is further strengthened by the utter devastation that has been wrought in many of the country’s Sunni-majority areas, a devastation that has only accelerated in the wake of IS’s military campaign, territorial acquisition, and persistent terrorism.
The centrality of oil to this arrangement means that “a relatively equitable distribution of this wealth will be key to future stability,” but this “will also require a relatively strong Baghdad.”[xiii]
This suggests that full implementation of the constitutional arrangements for decentralization would prove unworkable and counterproductive in practice; countrywide regionalization, including Basra and the South would likely set in motion powerful interests and forces that would undercut the economic viability of the Iraqi state.
But it is also clear that the current political order is unable to provide equitable and fair governance to all its citizens. While claims that Sunni marginalization is the prime driver of the rise of IS are misguided and hyperbolic, it is undoubtedly true that Iraq’s Sunni citizens have legitimate grievances based on the actions of Baghdad.
chattels: In this light, “a system of asymmetric federalism may be the most practical solution for the problems that Iraq faces because it most accurately reflects the country’s enduring ethnic and political realities.”[xiv]
In this case, an asymmetric outcome would recognize the special status of the KRG while allowing for further and necessary decentralization in other parts of the country.
As Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri further highlight, “no other model is likely to enable the country to reach an acceptable solution for Kurdistan while at the same time ensuring that the central government in Baghdad is viable enough to function.”[xv]
chattels: Reaching a settlement along these lines previously eluded Iraq’s political class, even at a time of decreasing violence and instability.
With the rise of IS and the loss of significant territory to that group, sectarian and ethnic polarization, and the further deterioration of trust among communities, have undermined the prospects for reaching such an accommodation.
Nonetheless, the instability of the current juncture renders such political steps imperative. The most immediate concern in this regard is bound up with the institutionalization of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the manner in which the central government interacts with and supports such local forces in Sunni-majority areas in the future.
The complex dynamics undergirding this issue can be seen in microcosm in the approach of Iraq’s political factions to the legislative issue of a National Guard force, which is understood by Sunnis as a necessary step for challenging IS and liberating IS-controlled territory in Sunni-majority areas.
Perhaps most importantly for Iraq’s Sunnis, the PMF issue will go a long way in determining whether the community can have any confidence in functional decentralization.
That confidence will be dependent on whether the central government can allow for provincial-level control of PMFs while properly and proportionately resourcing those forces.
In return, provincial leaders will have to allow the central government an oversight and collaborative role.
The precedent established by the PMF issue will have a disproportionate role in clarifying the political incentives for many Sunni leaders, and a positive resolution could encourage the mobilization of a critical mass of Sunni fighters, who will be indispensable in degrading IS military power and reach.
These steps would alter Iraq’s polarized sectarian political and security dynamics.
chattels: It remains the case that the PMF issue will serve as a litmus test for the willingness and ability of Iraq’s political class to cobble together a practicable resolution that incentivizes cooperation between Baghdad and the provinces. Further afield, successful decentralization in Sunni-majority areas of Iraq could provide a model for such efforts in Syria.
chattels: To create a sustainable asymmetric structure will also require the normalization and stabilization of Baghdad-KRG ties, which remain strained despite interim arrangements to halt further deterioration.
As Joost Hiltermann points out, “Baghdad and Erbil are being pushed apart by the way one of the two main Kurdish parties has openly called for Kurdish independence (while the other has not excluded it), by unilateral moves in the disputed territories, and by an ongoing quarrel over oil and money.”[xvii]
For Iraq’s Kurds, the prospect of independence remains an ultimate goal, and many believed those hopes were buoyed by the territorial gains made in the wake of the collapse of the Iraqi security forces, particularly as much of those gains happened in disputed territories such as the symbolically potent city of Kirkuk.
chattels: The need for a broad accommodation on decentralization remains acute and as IS loses momentum in Iraq, the need for robust planning for post-IS governance in liberated territories gains greater urgency and would boost the prospects for both the immediate military campaign against IS and other rejectionists, and the longer-term viability of Iraq.
An asymmetric outcome would also most accurately reflect the existing realities of the country.
It would be best accomplished through constitutional revision, but the unlikelihood of that occurring suggests that the most constructive way forward would be through legislative action.
Such efforts at legislative reform have failed previously in producing functional outcomes, but must again be attempted despite the even more challenging backdrop.
chattels: I encourage all to read the fuller version and I apologize for the long post in the chat, but the insight and commentary provided by this essay are very important, IMO
chattels: Asymmetric federalism or asymmetrical federalism is found in a federation or confederation in which different constituent states possess different powers: one or more of the states has considerably more autonomy than the other substates, although they have the same constitutional status. The division of powers between substates is not symmetric.
This is in contrast to symmetric federalism, where no distinction is made between constituent states.
As a result, it is frequently proposed as a solution to the dissatisfactions that arise when one or two constituent units feel significantly different needs from the others, as the result of an ethnic, linguistic or cultural difference.
The difference between an asymmetric federation and federacy is indistinct; a federacy is essentially an extreme case of an asymmetric federation, either due to large differences in the level of autonomy, or the rigidity of the constitutional arrangements.
An asymmetric federation however has to have a federal constitution and all states in federation have the same formal status ("state"), while in a federacy independent substate has a different status ("autonomous region").
[04:50:36 PM] chattels: http://ift.tt/1VxDLy2...
http://ift.tt/1KlV3bj
chattels: fed·er·a·cy ˈfed(ə)rəsē/Submit noun a group of states with a central government but independence in internal affairs; a federation. the state of being joined by a treaty.
chattels: www.google.com/webhp
http://ift.tt/1VxDLy7
chattels: By definition the difference between a confederation and a federation is that the membership of the member states in a confederation is voluntary, while the membership in a federation is not.
chattels: http://ift.tt/1VxDJpY...
http://ift.tt/1DoM4o8
chattels: there is an inherent tension in the push for greater decentralization by Iraq’s Kurds and Sunnis: “On the one hand, they want a Baghdad that cedes power, one that is weak enough not to interfere with their regional arrangements.
On the other hand, they also want a strong Baghdad, one that has the ability to pull oil revenue from Basra province (the source of about 80 percent of Iraq’s oil income) and distribute it throughout the country.”[xi]
As he further explains, “oil nationalism is the fundamental arrangement underlying the Iraqi state.”[xii]
This redistributive model and the inequitable geographic dispersion of natural resources will create a formidable check against separatist ambitions among the Kurds and the drive for greater autonomy on the part of Sunni-majority provinces.
This check is further strengthened by the utter devastation that has been wrought in many of the country’s Sunni-majority areas, a devastation that has only accelerated in the wake of IS’s military campaign, territorial acquisition, and persistent terrorism.
The centrality of oil to this arrangement means that “a relatively equitable distribution of this wealth will be key to future stability,” but this “will also require a relatively strong Baghdad.”
chattels: a strong Baghdad, one that has the ability to pull oil revenue from Basra province (the source of about 80 percent of Iraq’s oil income) and distribute it throughout the country.”
chattels: wealthwatch.world/showthr...
http://ift.tt/1VxDJq2
chattels: I guess that I ran off everyone
Donnie: ‹@chattels› if Basra provide 80% of iraqs oil income
Donnie: then why is it all we hear from are the kurds like they are the main income machine for Iraq?
Donnie: why isn't Basra threatening to breakaway ?
MichelleL: chattels you're not that lucky, we're all still here, just resting
chattels: ‹@Donnie› Basra speaks about forming a region from time to time
chattels: ‹@Donnie› i do not recall the Kurds claiming such
chattels: ‹@Donnie› Basra is Shia country
chattels: ‹@Donnie› Basra talks about deserving a bigger piece of the pie
Comments may be made at the end of Part 2 Thank You
The centrality of oil to this arrangement means that “a relatively equitable distribution of this wealth will be key to future stability,” but this “will also require a relatively strong Baghdad.”
chattels: a strong Baghdad, one that has the ability to pull oil revenue from Basra province (the source of about 80 percent of Iraq’s oil income) and distribute it throughout the country.”
chattels: wealthwatch.world/showthr...
http://ift.tt/1VxDJq2
chattels: I guess that I ran off everyone
Donnie: ‹@chattels› if Basra provide 80% of iraqs oil income
Donnie: then why is it all we hear from are the kurds like they are the main income machine for Iraq?
Donnie: why isn't Basra threatening to breakaway ?
MichelleL: chattels you're not that lucky, we're all still here, just resting
chattels: ‹@Donnie› Basra speaks about forming a region from time to time
chattels: ‹@Donnie› i do not recall the Kurds claiming such
chattels: ‹@Donnie› Basra is Shia country
chattels: ‹@Donnie› Basra talks about deserving a bigger piece of the pie
Comments may be made at the end of Part 2 Thank You
via Dinar Recaps - Our Blog http://ift.tt/1KlV0MJ
No comments:
Post a Comment