MODERATOR: Okay, Justin.
QUESTION: Just a couple of technical questions about the fight in Ramadi. You – do you have an estimate about how many fighters – ISIS fighters were in Ramadi? How many ISF fighters fled?
And when they fled, did they lay down these weapons that you said were flooded into Ramadi, did they leave them behind? There’ve been some images of that. And then my second question would be: Is there a clear military strategy to retake Ramadi?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So really good questions. I would be very hesitant to say a number of Daesh fighters in Ramadi and also I’d be hesitant if anyone is telling you a number, because it’s very hard to tell these things.
When Mosul fell, I think our estimate was that Daesh as an organization had only about 5- to 10,000. We then adjusted that and said, no, it’s actually 30,000. These are very hard to tell. So we don’t know.
~~~
QUESTION: Just a couple of technical questions about the fight in Ramadi. You – do you have an estimate about how many fighters – ISIS fighters were in Ramadi? How many ISF fighters fled?
And when they fled, did they lay down these weapons that you said were flooded into Ramadi, did they leave them behind? There’ve been some images of that. And then my second question would be: Is there a clear military strategy to retake Ramadi?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So really good questions. I would be very hesitant to say a number of Daesh fighters in Ramadi and also I’d be hesitant if anyone is telling you a number, because it’s very hard to tell these things.
When Mosul fell, I think our estimate was that Daesh as an organization had only about 5- to 10,000. We then adjusted that and said, no, it’s actually 30,000. These are very hard to tell. So we don’t know.
~~~
What we do know is that about half of Ramadi has been under Daesh control for about a year, and in their offensive they launched a month ago they took another quarter of it.
So they have been controlling significant portions of the city for some time. What happened last weekend was they had this massive suicide wave that at the governing center, which was kind of the center of it, the kind of secured zone. And again, you can see the pictures they put out.
It was incredibly devastating, just horrific, gigantic explosions that took out entire city blocks. So they have a force in Ramadi. I don’t know the numbers. And I don’t think – I also don’t think it’s one that can’t be overcome.
I don’t have the numbers of Iraqis that retreated. They did leave some equipment behind.
I’m told that when we see Daesh trying to get ahold of that equipment, we’ll take care of that problem.
But they also – again, unlike Mosul, in which you had security forces just drop their uniforms and flee these units – I wouldn’t call it organized, but they retreated in a way that they took most of their stuff, and then they stopped at a defensive point and consolidated.
And they’re now in the process of – I was just told talking to our guys out there they’re now in the process of refueling, refitting, licking their wounds a bit, and consolidating.
So in the wake of Mosul, having lived through that, at this point in Mosul there was just a real disintegration happening , and that’s not at all what we’re seeing here; quite the opposite. However --
MODERATOR: Okay – sorry. Felicia, then Tolga.
QUESTION: So with the renewed focus on Anbar, how does that impact the Mosul timing at all? And does the focus on Anbar mean pushing the Islamic State out of Fallujah as well?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Fallujah is a little isolated pocket, which we always – again, up to the Iraqis, but you can kind of isolate it and do some other things.
And I defer to my military colleagues, but you’ve got to do Anbar – you can call it shaping for Mosul, you can call it – but you got to do Anbar to isolate Mosul.
So – and that means Baghdad to Ramadi, Ramadi to Haditha. And Haditha is out at Al Asad where we’re based. And I just – look, I think this is going to take some time, so it’s going to be very difficult. Anyone who knows Anbar province from back when we were there, it’s going to be really hard.
But what we were hearing from the Iraqis up and down the board – and I was on the phone with some of the Anbaris today – they are – nobody is panicking. They are – what they are telling us is we’re ready to rise to this challenge.
And everybody is focused like a laser on Anbar right now, so there’s some other fights going on which are really important. There’s Baiji, there’s some stuff going on out in Haditha, but – which, of course, is in Anbar. But really everybody’s focused on Anbar.
MODERATOR: Okay. Tolga.
QUESTION: And just to follow on to – oh, sorry. Can I ask one more?
MODERATOR: Go ahead.
QUESTION: Just to follow on to Brad’s question with the timing, does this pushback that – and you said some of the timing was perhaps unrealistic --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, I would never put timeframes on anything, so Mosul will happen when it’s ready. So it could be some time from now, but we’re focused on Anbar.
MODERATOR: Tolga, then Pam.
QUESTION: How about the population left in Ramadi after the invasion of Ramadi? How many people are there right now? Because the CENTCOM released the new attacks records for 24 – the last 24 hours that there were nothing in Ramadi. Sixteen strikes in – from Mosul to Fallujah but not in Ramadi.
What are the challenge – challenges to retake Ramadi in terms of the population left in there, and could you please make a comparison between Kobani and Ramadi?
You made a comparison between Mosul and Ramadi, and you said that there – at least there was a tactical retreat, that there is no (inaudible) disintegration in terms of the Iraq Security Forces, but what went wrong in Ramadi while you succeeded in Kobani? What was the main difference?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I’m not going to put numbers on who’s left in Ramadi, but right now the streets look pretty barren from what we’re seeing. We have done airstrikes today in Ramadi, I’ve been told. So when we see targets, we’re going to take them out, and we have the area pretty well covered.
There’s been, of course, a large refugee flow, which our humanitarian people are dealing with with the United Nations and we’re dealing with the Iraqi Government about how to manage that in an organized way. And it’s also one reason why we hope our coalition partners will consider helping with the UN response in terms of financial contributions.
Look, Kobani – just a different situation. But Kobani was about to fall as well. There was a little – if you looked on a map, it was just a pencil –
I lived through that – in terms of organizing to push back and working with the Turks and the Kurdish Peshmerga to do that in an organized way, which was quite successful.
Had Daesh been able to do in Kobani what they did over the weekend in Ramadi with 10 of these massive VBIEDs, Kobani would have fallen too, but they weren’t able to do that.
So the attacks over the weekend in Ramadi were just quite devastating in terms of ISIL attacks.
And you can go see them, and I have some pictures in my – there was a armored bulldozer which knocked over the T-wall perimeters, which then was the first explosion.
They then had an armored dump truck, an armored Humvee, and you can see what they do. They weld these things so they’re totally impervious to a lot of weapons systems that the Iraqis have to try to take them out. It was one of – I have to say it was one of Abadi’s main demands when he was here.
He needed a weapon system to defeat suicide VBIEDs. And we made the decision immediately while he was here to get 1,000 AT4 anti-tank systems to Iraqi Security Forces. And those are going to be arriving fairly soon.
And that’s specifically, as I understand it – I’ll defer to experts on this, but that’s specifically a kind of close-in weapon system for a VBIED that is coming in your direction. The Peshmerga have been using them to good effect and we’re getting 1,000 to the Iraqi Security Forces.
QUESTION: Days, weeks? What’s the timeframe?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Weeks. Early June, I’m told.
MODERATOR: Okay. Pam.
QUESTION: A couple of questions. The first one goes back to Iran. Overall, how much influence do you think Iran has over the Iraqi Government in terms of the anti-ISIS coalition at this point? And how is that affecting U.S. operations against the Islamic State?
And then my second question is you referenced the meeting yesterday with the President looking at possible responses. In addition to airstrikes, is there anything else that bubbles to the top that you can talk about in terms of action that the coalition is considering?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: On the second question, I’m just not going to get ahead of the process and what might be considered or not considered. I’m sorry, I just can’t really get into that.
The meeting was a very firm affirmation for the leadership of Prime Minister Abadi, who is managing multiple crises, and for – we think the plan they laid out is a pretty good one, and we’re going to help them with that as much as we can. And then anything else that we’re thinking about, I just can’t – I really can’t get into.
MODERATOR: Okay. Very little time left in – I’m sorry, Iran and then --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The issue of Iran – again, Iran and Iraq have a relationship. It’s something that has been with us for some time. It’s something that’s natural and is going to continue.
And it becomes problematic if Iran is doing things on Iraqi soil that are contrary to the sovereignty and the wishes of the Iraqi Government. So again, we just have to see.
MODERATOR: Okay. Very short. Barbara?
QUESTION: Just quickly, you’re talking about consolidating the ISF units. How is that working practically with the Popular Mobilization Forces? We’ve been hearing they’ve arrived but they haven’t – that they’re sort of waiting to take positions. Or is how that being coordinated?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. So some of them are – and unclear in numbers or what – but are gathering at Habbaniyah, which is an airbase. And that’s a consolidation point.
But you’ve got to remember, the Popular Mobilization Forces, of about 80,000 of them, the majority of them are guys that volunteered in the wake of Sistani’s fatwa last year. They’re volunteer fighters.
They can work very closely with Sunnis; these are all Iraqis. There are other units within the Popular Mobilization Forces on the Shia side that are different, that are militias that are organized not by Iraqis, frankly. So those are different types of units.
And so you have to look at this fairly diagnostically, and what units go where will be important, and I think the Iraqis understand the sensitivities as well as anybody. And they’re working this out as we speak.
QUESTION: So there are no Shia militias in the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, there are Shia militias within the 80,000 – the usual suspects of KH and AH that we know quite well.
QUESTION: The so the point that you’re making is that some are Shia militias that you wouldn’t want to go to certain areas, and others are Shia fighters who you’d be okay with going --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It’s just a facility there are more provocative – some units are quite provocative in Sunni areas. And so --
QUESTION: And --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And we want to be very careful before we do airstrikes, because we’re coming from the air, we don’t have people on the ground. We don’t want to have a situation in which we mistakenly strike a Shia militia, because that would cause all sorts of problems.
So this has – that’s why we – the importance of Iraqi command and control. Because the way we do operations with the Iraqis, and every time we’ve done one, they’ve been quite successful, all the way from Mosul Dam to – I can go all the way down to Kisik Junction, to Haditha.
We take some time to really do the intelligence, to soak the area, to figure out what’s going on, to organize the forces through our joint operations center that we have, which has been up now for a year – is working pretty effectively – to organize the forces, who goes where, so then our airstrikes can work in a very deliberate, coordinated manner.
If there are units on the field that aren’t responsive to that chain of command, we can’t tell from the air who’s who and it can be very chaotic. So that’s why particularly in Tikrit we said, “You got to get a handle on who’s who and who’s where and get control over the units on the field.”
Because we’re very careful with our air – it’s been one of the most precise air campaigns in history thus far, and we’re very careful with it. So we want to make sure that Iraqi forces on the ground are as much as possible under Iraqi command.
QUESTION: Even in Tikrit, though, there were fairly well documented reports of Shia militias afterwards rampaging, burning people, clearly not operating under any kind of Iraqi central government command and control.
And so the fundamental question that I have is: What gives you – I mean, Tikrit was not that longer ago. What gives you the confidence that these militias, which have the autonomy of their own armaments, are actually going to be taking orders from Baghdad, and are not in fact going to be operating on their own?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, this is something we’ve got to work through. So before we do an operation and make sure that it’s a coordinated operation, we have to have as much as possible fidelity over who is on the field. But it is very difficult.
QUESTION: How do you do that without coordinating or working somehow with the Iranians?
MODERATOR: Michel.
QUESTION: Do you think that the coalition strategy is working, especially after the advances made by ISIS in Ramadi and advances made in Syria yesterday and today in Tadmor? And are you planning to do anything in Tadmor to help the regime, for example, to stop ISIS?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right now the immediate focus – at least for me, who’s briefing you – has been Anbar. So that’s what I’ve been focused on for the last 96 hours.
And in terms of the overall campaign, as I said in the beginning, you would have to be delusional not to take something like this and say, “What went wrong, how do you fix it, and how do we correct course to go from here?” And that’s exactly what we’re doing, taking an extremely hard look at it.
One of the main things is the tactic of these enormous suicide VBIEDs is something that we have to help the Iraqis and our partners in Syria defeat. So that’s something we’re looking at very closely.
And in terms of the particular response in Anbar and Ramadi, again, we’re looking at a number of things, but I don’t want to get ahead of the process.
So they have been controlling significant portions of the city for some time. What happened last weekend was they had this massive suicide wave that at the governing center, which was kind of the center of it, the kind of secured zone. And again, you can see the pictures they put out.
It was incredibly devastating, just horrific, gigantic explosions that took out entire city blocks. So they have a force in Ramadi. I don’t know the numbers. And I don’t think – I also don’t think it’s one that can’t be overcome.
I don’t have the numbers of Iraqis that retreated. They did leave some equipment behind.
I’m told that when we see Daesh trying to get ahold of that equipment, we’ll take care of that problem.
But they also – again, unlike Mosul, in which you had security forces just drop their uniforms and flee these units – I wouldn’t call it organized, but they retreated in a way that they took most of their stuff, and then they stopped at a defensive point and consolidated.
And they’re now in the process of – I was just told talking to our guys out there they’re now in the process of refueling, refitting, licking their wounds a bit, and consolidating.
So in the wake of Mosul, having lived through that, at this point in Mosul there was just a real disintegration happening , and that’s not at all what we’re seeing here; quite the opposite. However --
MODERATOR: Okay – sorry. Felicia, then Tolga.
QUESTION: So with the renewed focus on Anbar, how does that impact the Mosul timing at all? And does the focus on Anbar mean pushing the Islamic State out of Fallujah as well?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Fallujah is a little isolated pocket, which we always – again, up to the Iraqis, but you can kind of isolate it and do some other things.
And I defer to my military colleagues, but you’ve got to do Anbar – you can call it shaping for Mosul, you can call it – but you got to do Anbar to isolate Mosul.
So – and that means Baghdad to Ramadi, Ramadi to Haditha. And Haditha is out at Al Asad where we’re based. And I just – look, I think this is going to take some time, so it’s going to be very difficult. Anyone who knows Anbar province from back when we were there, it’s going to be really hard.
But what we were hearing from the Iraqis up and down the board – and I was on the phone with some of the Anbaris today – they are – nobody is panicking. They are – what they are telling us is we’re ready to rise to this challenge.
And everybody is focused like a laser on Anbar right now, so there’s some other fights going on which are really important. There’s Baiji, there’s some stuff going on out in Haditha, but – which, of course, is in Anbar. But really everybody’s focused on Anbar.
MODERATOR: Okay. Tolga.
QUESTION: And just to follow on to – oh, sorry. Can I ask one more?
MODERATOR: Go ahead.
QUESTION: Just to follow on to Brad’s question with the timing, does this pushback that – and you said some of the timing was perhaps unrealistic --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, I would never put timeframes on anything, so Mosul will happen when it’s ready. So it could be some time from now, but we’re focused on Anbar.
MODERATOR: Tolga, then Pam.
QUESTION: How about the population left in Ramadi after the invasion of Ramadi? How many people are there right now? Because the CENTCOM released the new attacks records for 24 – the last 24 hours that there were nothing in Ramadi. Sixteen strikes in – from Mosul to Fallujah but not in Ramadi.
What are the challenge – challenges to retake Ramadi in terms of the population left in there, and could you please make a comparison between Kobani and Ramadi?
You made a comparison between Mosul and Ramadi, and you said that there – at least there was a tactical retreat, that there is no (inaudible) disintegration in terms of the Iraq Security Forces, but what went wrong in Ramadi while you succeeded in Kobani? What was the main difference?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I’m not going to put numbers on who’s left in Ramadi, but right now the streets look pretty barren from what we’re seeing. We have done airstrikes today in Ramadi, I’ve been told. So when we see targets, we’re going to take them out, and we have the area pretty well covered.
There’s been, of course, a large refugee flow, which our humanitarian people are dealing with with the United Nations and we’re dealing with the Iraqi Government about how to manage that in an organized way. And it’s also one reason why we hope our coalition partners will consider helping with the UN response in terms of financial contributions.
Look, Kobani – just a different situation. But Kobani was about to fall as well. There was a little – if you looked on a map, it was just a pencil –
I lived through that – in terms of organizing to push back and working with the Turks and the Kurdish Peshmerga to do that in an organized way, which was quite successful.
Had Daesh been able to do in Kobani what they did over the weekend in Ramadi with 10 of these massive VBIEDs, Kobani would have fallen too, but they weren’t able to do that.
So the attacks over the weekend in Ramadi were just quite devastating in terms of ISIL attacks.
And you can go see them, and I have some pictures in my – there was a armored bulldozer which knocked over the T-wall perimeters, which then was the first explosion.
They then had an armored dump truck, an armored Humvee, and you can see what they do. They weld these things so they’re totally impervious to a lot of weapons systems that the Iraqis have to try to take them out. It was one of – I have to say it was one of Abadi’s main demands when he was here.
He needed a weapon system to defeat suicide VBIEDs. And we made the decision immediately while he was here to get 1,000 AT4 anti-tank systems to Iraqi Security Forces. And those are going to be arriving fairly soon.
And that’s specifically, as I understand it – I’ll defer to experts on this, but that’s specifically a kind of close-in weapon system for a VBIED that is coming in your direction. The Peshmerga have been using them to good effect and we’re getting 1,000 to the Iraqi Security Forces.
QUESTION: Days, weeks? What’s the timeframe?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Weeks. Early June, I’m told.
MODERATOR: Okay. Pam.
QUESTION: A couple of questions. The first one goes back to Iran. Overall, how much influence do you think Iran has over the Iraqi Government in terms of the anti-ISIS coalition at this point? And how is that affecting U.S. operations against the Islamic State?
And then my second question is you referenced the meeting yesterday with the President looking at possible responses. In addition to airstrikes, is there anything else that bubbles to the top that you can talk about in terms of action that the coalition is considering?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: On the second question, I’m just not going to get ahead of the process and what might be considered or not considered. I’m sorry, I just can’t really get into that.
The meeting was a very firm affirmation for the leadership of Prime Minister Abadi, who is managing multiple crises, and for – we think the plan they laid out is a pretty good one, and we’re going to help them with that as much as we can. And then anything else that we’re thinking about, I just can’t – I really can’t get into.
MODERATOR: Okay. Very little time left in – I’m sorry, Iran and then --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The issue of Iran – again, Iran and Iraq have a relationship. It’s something that has been with us for some time. It’s something that’s natural and is going to continue.
And it becomes problematic if Iran is doing things on Iraqi soil that are contrary to the sovereignty and the wishes of the Iraqi Government. So again, we just have to see.
MODERATOR: Okay. Very short. Barbara?
QUESTION: Just quickly, you’re talking about consolidating the ISF units. How is that working practically with the Popular Mobilization Forces? We’ve been hearing they’ve arrived but they haven’t – that they’re sort of waiting to take positions. Or is how that being coordinated?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. So some of them are – and unclear in numbers or what – but are gathering at Habbaniyah, which is an airbase. And that’s a consolidation point.
But you’ve got to remember, the Popular Mobilization Forces, of about 80,000 of them, the majority of them are guys that volunteered in the wake of Sistani’s fatwa last year. They’re volunteer fighters.
They can work very closely with Sunnis; these are all Iraqis. There are other units within the Popular Mobilization Forces on the Shia side that are different, that are militias that are organized not by Iraqis, frankly. So those are different types of units.
And so you have to look at this fairly diagnostically, and what units go where will be important, and I think the Iraqis understand the sensitivities as well as anybody. And they’re working this out as we speak.
QUESTION: So there are no Shia militias in the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, there are Shia militias within the 80,000 – the usual suspects of KH and AH that we know quite well.
QUESTION: The so the point that you’re making is that some are Shia militias that you wouldn’t want to go to certain areas, and others are Shia fighters who you’d be okay with going --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It’s just a facility there are more provocative – some units are quite provocative in Sunni areas. And so --
QUESTION: And --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And we want to be very careful before we do airstrikes, because we’re coming from the air, we don’t have people on the ground. We don’t want to have a situation in which we mistakenly strike a Shia militia, because that would cause all sorts of problems.
So this has – that’s why we – the importance of Iraqi command and control. Because the way we do operations with the Iraqis, and every time we’ve done one, they’ve been quite successful, all the way from Mosul Dam to – I can go all the way down to Kisik Junction, to Haditha.
We take some time to really do the intelligence, to soak the area, to figure out what’s going on, to organize the forces through our joint operations center that we have, which has been up now for a year – is working pretty effectively – to organize the forces, who goes where, so then our airstrikes can work in a very deliberate, coordinated manner.
If there are units on the field that aren’t responsive to that chain of command, we can’t tell from the air who’s who and it can be very chaotic. So that’s why particularly in Tikrit we said, “You got to get a handle on who’s who and who’s where and get control over the units on the field.”
Because we’re very careful with our air – it’s been one of the most precise air campaigns in history thus far, and we’re very careful with it. So we want to make sure that Iraqi forces on the ground are as much as possible under Iraqi command.
QUESTION: Even in Tikrit, though, there were fairly well documented reports of Shia militias afterwards rampaging, burning people, clearly not operating under any kind of Iraqi central government command and control.
And so the fundamental question that I have is: What gives you – I mean, Tikrit was not that longer ago. What gives you the confidence that these militias, which have the autonomy of their own armaments, are actually going to be taking orders from Baghdad, and are not in fact going to be operating on their own?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, this is something we’ve got to work through. So before we do an operation and make sure that it’s a coordinated operation, we have to have as much as possible fidelity over who is on the field. But it is very difficult.
QUESTION: How do you do that without coordinating or working somehow with the Iranians?
MODERATOR: Michel.
QUESTION: Do you think that the coalition strategy is working, especially after the advances made by ISIS in Ramadi and advances made in Syria yesterday and today in Tadmor? And are you planning to do anything in Tadmor to help the regime, for example, to stop ISIS?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right now the immediate focus – at least for me, who’s briefing you – has been Anbar. So that’s what I’ve been focused on for the last 96 hours.
And in terms of the overall campaign, as I said in the beginning, you would have to be delusional not to take something like this and say, “What went wrong, how do you fix it, and how do we correct course to go from here?” And that’s exactly what we’re doing, taking an extremely hard look at it.
One of the main things is the tactic of these enormous suicide VBIEDs is something that we have to help the Iraqis and our partners in Syria defeat. So that’s something we’re looking at very closely.
And in terms of the particular response in Anbar and Ramadi, again, we’re looking at a number of things, but I don’t want to get ahead of the process.
MODERATOR: We got time for just two more. Hannah, go ahead.
QUESTION: Okay. First of all, on the refugee issue, what are you – what are the discussions with Abadi about letting people in? I mean, you’ve got thousands of people stranded, four days, they can’t go back, they get killed, they won’t let them in even with a sponsor now.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So I understand – again, I’ve been told as of this morning that the bridge has been open for refugees with a sponsor with a place to – what that means is that they need a place to go in Baghdad because you can’t just have a – otherwise, you just have a really chaotic situation which can quickly get out of control.
So the bridge has been open to refugees with a sponsor in Baghdad. And the UN, again, who is doing just heroic work, is working to set up facilities for those who are on the other side of the bridge. That’s what’s happening as we speak, so hopefully, I’ll have a little more for you in the next 24 hours or so.
QUESTION: And then just lastly on Habbaniyah, is there no – what is the U.S. presence at Habbaniyah? Are there security contractors involved in the training? If so, how many?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. I’ve seen different reports, a lot of it being ISIS propaganda. I’ve seen that we have taken out our advisors from Habbaniyah and we never had advisors at Habbaniyah.
QUESTION: Whether military or (inaudible)?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right. I’ve seen that we’ve taken out our advisors at al-Asad. That’s absolutely not true. We’re at al-Asad working with the tribes in the 7th IA as we speak. So – but we have not been on the ground at Habbaniyah.
In terms of what we might do in Anbar additionally, again, that’s something that is – I won’t get ahead of any decision processes with the president.
MODERATOR: Okay. Last question there.
QUESTION: Yeah. How many Sunni tribal fighters have actually been trained and equipped in Anbar so far? And how can you better coordinate airstrikes in support of their operations going forward? I know you said they’ve got 24/7 in Ramadi now going forward.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, really good question. So where it works well has been out at al-Asad. We’re working with three tribes – the Jughayfis, the Albu Mahal, Albu Nimr, primarily, the Jughayfis who are out there.
And we are able to coordinate them – with them, advise and assist. It’s not perfect. It’s really hard. I’ve been out there twice. It’s like Wild West. I mean, really tough. But we’re able to directly coordinate and provide them very close in support and coordinate their operations. And we’ve had some success of the --
QUESTION: From the area?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes, although ISIS fights back. But we have our special forces there on the ground at Asad. We just don’t – we don’t accompany. We don’t go out with them.
So that’s where it works the best. We don’t have that in eastern Anbar, frankly, so it’s just a different – it’s a little more difficult.
What the Iraqis have done is they’ve used Habbaniyah, they’ve set up Habbaniyah to be the same type of facility that we have at al-Asad, where – collect tribal fighters, organize them so they’re on a payroll, give them a weapon.
And that started about three weeks ago, and there was going to be a ceremony on Monday on this same thing with about another thousand fighters. But that’s going to continue.
So the Iraqis are using Habbaniyah with the same model that we’ve used at Asad quite effectively, and we want to build on that. And so in terms of this consolidation, making sure that those areas remain controlled is very important. We think they will remain controlled.
And it’s a huge facility. I mean, it’s a huge airbase, Habbaniyah and also Taqaddum across the street. It’s enormous. So, I mean, that’s how they’re collecting them.
In terms of numbers, there’s budget and weapons for 8,000 tribal fighters in Anbar province, and there’s also the 24,000 police and there’s the now recruiting into the 7th IA, that I don’t have a figure on yet.
So those are the numbers. And we collect them at al-Asad, which has been effective, and the Iraqis are now setting up this hub at Habbaniyah, which started – there was a ceremony 10 days ago or so, which you may have seen in the media, because it was – I know there was some media there.
QUESTION: But of 8,000 and 24,000, how many have actually now returned or are trained?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The 24,000 are – of the total, if you ask the guys who do the police, there were a total of 24,000 Anbari policemen before --
QUESTION: Right.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- this crisis started 18 months ago.
QUESTION: They fled (inaudible).
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And they fled.
QUESTION: And how many came back?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And obviously didn’t come back. This is just – the police part has just started and --
QUESTION: Okay.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- the police part is long term.
QUESTION: And of the 8,000 that you budgeted to train and equip, how many of those are actually now in the field or in the pipeline, at least?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I actually do have a figure that I – but I just don’t want to get into a direct figure. But it’s in the thousands.
QUESTION: Low thousands, mid thousands?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Mid thousands.
QUESTION: Okay.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So if you look on a map of the Euphrates and the dashes – so it’s Raqqah to Ramadi to Fallujah – there’s a red swatch sweep and then there’s a green circle at Haditha, Baghdadi, which is where we’re present, which is where we’re working with those tribes, and which has been pretty effective.
So we have an operational platform there, and they’ve been able to hold and expand their territory.
The Iraqis want to do the same thing at Habbaniyah, where you collect the tribes with the eastern tribes and do the same thing to create this other circle. And that, of course, is not far from Ramadi.
So I don’t want to get into the consolidation points that we’re going to use, but Habbaniyah will certainly be one of them.
QUESTION: And it’s 8,000 that the Iraqis have budgeted, it’s not (inaudible)?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, 8,000 tribal fighters in Anbar, and the weapons have been all approved and it’s just – we have to get them to the site and get them to the guys.
QUESTION: As far as actually fighting on the ground and the – to – in – as part of these in the line-holding and consolidation and everything, how many Sunni tribal fighters are involved now?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: In Anbar?
QUESTION: Yeah.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Overall Sunni fighters, according to our count, is above 10,000. It’s now above 10,000. And about 22,000 are on the rolls, but 10,000 are actually in the program. In Anbar, I just don’t have the figure off the top of my head, but I’ve – I’ll get it to you.
QUESTION: So it’s national, that’s – nation – that’s in the program overall, not necessarily fighting?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, Nineveh – right, so Nineveh – Nineveh there’s no presence, but we’re training about 6,000 in the Mosul fighting force and a number of other guys from Atheel Nujaifi’s these guys. And also in Salah ad Din and in – and then in Anbar, mostly at al-Asad but now at Habbaniyah.
MODERATOR: Okay. Thanks very much, [Senior State Department Official]. Again, this is on background, Senior State Department Official. Thanks for coming and thanks (inaudible).
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QUESTION: Okay. First of all, on the refugee issue, what are you – what are the discussions with Abadi about letting people in? I mean, you’ve got thousands of people stranded, four days, they can’t go back, they get killed, they won’t let them in even with a sponsor now.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So I understand – again, I’ve been told as of this morning that the bridge has been open for refugees with a sponsor with a place to – what that means is that they need a place to go in Baghdad because you can’t just have a – otherwise, you just have a really chaotic situation which can quickly get out of control.
So the bridge has been open to refugees with a sponsor in Baghdad. And the UN, again, who is doing just heroic work, is working to set up facilities for those who are on the other side of the bridge. That’s what’s happening as we speak, so hopefully, I’ll have a little more for you in the next 24 hours or so.
QUESTION: And then just lastly on Habbaniyah, is there no – what is the U.S. presence at Habbaniyah? Are there security contractors involved in the training? If so, how many?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. I’ve seen different reports, a lot of it being ISIS propaganda. I’ve seen that we have taken out our advisors from Habbaniyah and we never had advisors at Habbaniyah.
QUESTION: Whether military or (inaudible)?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right. I’ve seen that we’ve taken out our advisors at al-Asad. That’s absolutely not true. We’re at al-Asad working with the tribes in the 7th IA as we speak. So – but we have not been on the ground at Habbaniyah.
In terms of what we might do in Anbar additionally, again, that’s something that is – I won’t get ahead of any decision processes with the president.
MODERATOR: Okay. Last question there.
QUESTION: Yeah. How many Sunni tribal fighters have actually been trained and equipped in Anbar so far? And how can you better coordinate airstrikes in support of their operations going forward? I know you said they’ve got 24/7 in Ramadi now going forward.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, really good question. So where it works well has been out at al-Asad. We’re working with three tribes – the Jughayfis, the Albu Mahal, Albu Nimr, primarily, the Jughayfis who are out there.
And we are able to coordinate them – with them, advise and assist. It’s not perfect. It’s really hard. I’ve been out there twice. It’s like Wild West. I mean, really tough. But we’re able to directly coordinate and provide them very close in support and coordinate their operations. And we’ve had some success of the --
QUESTION: From the area?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes, although ISIS fights back. But we have our special forces there on the ground at Asad. We just don’t – we don’t accompany. We don’t go out with them.
So that’s where it works the best. We don’t have that in eastern Anbar, frankly, so it’s just a different – it’s a little more difficult.
What the Iraqis have done is they’ve used Habbaniyah, they’ve set up Habbaniyah to be the same type of facility that we have at al-Asad, where – collect tribal fighters, organize them so they’re on a payroll, give them a weapon.
And that started about three weeks ago, and there was going to be a ceremony on Monday on this same thing with about another thousand fighters. But that’s going to continue.
So the Iraqis are using Habbaniyah with the same model that we’ve used at Asad quite effectively, and we want to build on that. And so in terms of this consolidation, making sure that those areas remain controlled is very important. We think they will remain controlled.
And it’s a huge facility. I mean, it’s a huge airbase, Habbaniyah and also Taqaddum across the street. It’s enormous. So, I mean, that’s how they’re collecting them.
In terms of numbers, there’s budget and weapons for 8,000 tribal fighters in Anbar province, and there’s also the 24,000 police and there’s the now recruiting into the 7th IA, that I don’t have a figure on yet.
So those are the numbers. And we collect them at al-Asad, which has been effective, and the Iraqis are now setting up this hub at Habbaniyah, which started – there was a ceremony 10 days ago or so, which you may have seen in the media, because it was – I know there was some media there.
QUESTION: But of 8,000 and 24,000, how many have actually now returned or are trained?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The 24,000 are – of the total, if you ask the guys who do the police, there were a total of 24,000 Anbari policemen before --
QUESTION: Right.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- this crisis started 18 months ago.
QUESTION: They fled (inaudible).
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And they fled.
QUESTION: And how many came back?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And obviously didn’t come back. This is just – the police part has just started and --
QUESTION: Okay.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- the police part is long term.
QUESTION: And of the 8,000 that you budgeted to train and equip, how many of those are actually now in the field or in the pipeline, at least?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I actually do have a figure that I – but I just don’t want to get into a direct figure. But it’s in the thousands.
QUESTION: Low thousands, mid thousands?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Mid thousands.
QUESTION: Okay.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So if you look on a map of the Euphrates and the dashes – so it’s Raqqah to Ramadi to Fallujah – there’s a red swatch sweep and then there’s a green circle at Haditha, Baghdadi, which is where we’re present, which is where we’re working with those tribes, and which has been pretty effective.
So we have an operational platform there, and they’ve been able to hold and expand their territory.
The Iraqis want to do the same thing at Habbaniyah, where you collect the tribes with the eastern tribes and do the same thing to create this other circle. And that, of course, is not far from Ramadi.
So I don’t want to get into the consolidation points that we’re going to use, but Habbaniyah will certainly be one of them.
QUESTION: And it’s 8,000 that the Iraqis have budgeted, it’s not (inaudible)?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, 8,000 tribal fighters in Anbar, and the weapons have been all approved and it’s just – we have to get them to the site and get them to the guys.
QUESTION: As far as actually fighting on the ground and the – to – in – as part of these in the line-holding and consolidation and everything, how many Sunni tribal fighters are involved now?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: In Anbar?
QUESTION: Yeah.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Overall Sunni fighters, according to our count, is above 10,000. It’s now above 10,000. And about 22,000 are on the rolls, but 10,000 are actually in the program. In Anbar, I just don’t have the figure off the top of my head, but I’ve – I’ll get it to you.
QUESTION: So it’s national, that’s – nation – that’s in the program overall, not necessarily fighting?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, Nineveh – right, so Nineveh – Nineveh there’s no presence, but we’re training about 6,000 in the Mosul fighting force and a number of other guys from Atheel Nujaifi’s these guys. And also in Salah ad Din and in – and then in Anbar, mostly at al-Asad but now at Habbaniyah.
MODERATOR: Okay. Thanks very much, [Senior State Department Official]. Again, this is on background, Senior State Department Official. Thanks for coming and thanks (inaudible).
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