Post From BondLadys Corner
BondLady & Tlm724 News & Comments 6-17-16
The Menace of Blackmail Politics in Iraq. By Abbas Kadhim, Ph.D. *
For half a century before its 2003 regime change, Iraq experienced escalating levels of authoritarianism that increased with the passing of time and the change of successive governments. A Coup d’état was the only possible method of regime change.
What began as a benevolent dictatorship in 1958 soon turned into an increasingly oppressive sectarian rule between 1963 and 1979, and this latter transformed into an absolute tyranny under Saddam Hussein’s family rule that even a coup d’état became impossible. It took a coalition of nations, led by the United States of America, to impose a regime change by military means.
~~~
BondLady & Tlm724 News & Comments 6-17-16
The Menace of Blackmail Politics in Iraq. By Abbas Kadhim, Ph.D. *
For half a century before its 2003 regime change, Iraq experienced escalating levels of authoritarianism that increased with the passing of time and the change of successive governments. A Coup d’état was the only possible method of regime change.
What began as a benevolent dictatorship in 1958 soon turned into an increasingly oppressive sectarian rule between 1963 and 1979, and this latter transformed into an absolute tyranny under Saddam Hussein’s family rule that even a coup d’état became impossible. It took a coalition of nations, led by the United States of America, to impose a regime change by military means.
~~~
The framers of Iraq’s new constitutional system were heavily influenced by the country’s past experience with authoritarianism and acted out of fear more than hope: they invested all their genius in closing all possible loopholes that might lead to the emergence of a dictator in the future.
In so doing, they ended up creating an anemic executive institution whose chief, the Prime Minister, lacks most of the powers that allow him to govern.
Nationally, Iraq is a federal state without a clear definition of its federalism. Each part of Iraq interprets, and practices, federalism in any fashion it can get away with. The northern region, ruled independently by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was acknowledged by the new constitution as an autonomous region with the same privileges that existed before 2003, and it acquired more measures of autonomy in the past years.
By contrast, other regions are living under a de facto centralized arrangement where Baghdad decides every aspect of their local governance.
The definition of federalism in the Kurdish north, defined as a virtual independence from Baghdad, fades to levels of non-existence in the southern province, Basra, whose local governance is decided by the central government and the local politicians who are subservient to large political parties and leaders from Baghdad.
In this confused environment, national politics and the outcome of governance are decided by a simple method, corrupt political deals made under the influence of duress and blackmail.
The KRG, armed with a very effective lobbying effort and an international sympathy for the suffering of Kurds under the murderous Ba’thist regime, has managed to convince the world that the situation in Iraq has not changed after 2003. The constitutional arrangement they secured, thanks to international meddling and incompetent negotiators on the other side, allows them a great room to maneuver.
The Kurdish leadership also use the issue of independence as a highly effective blackmail tool in their continued negotiation with Baghdad. In their entire post-2003 political participation, the Kurds showed no evidence of concern about anything happening in the rest of Iraq.
If anything, the cascade of security and political crises in the country were viewed by the Kurds as political opportunities to advance their position as a virtually independent state whose only relation with Baghdad is the 17% of the annual national budget they claim as their share.
They support their position by applying pressure on the rest of Iraq from their own region and augment that with influencing the national government’s decision by their representatives in the Iraqi Cabinet and Parliament who take part in the national decision making.
The Sunni Arabs are another political entity who also use blackmail as a favorite political method. But theirs is a more lethal form of blackmail. Their political talking point is that the only alternative to a satisfactory Sunni empowerment, however unreasonably they decide that, is terrorism throughout their region.
Since losing power in Iraq, which they held almost exclusively since the creation of the modern state, The Sunni Arabs, backed and encouraged by the regional Arab states, categorically rejected a regime change that granted them their fair share as a minority in the country.
Since 2003, a Sunni politician in Iraq would support the government as long as he is in a high position, but the moment he is replaced by a political process or losing an election, he would go back home, gather his armed tribesmen and declare war on the government under the banner of Sunni marginalization.
Except for a few Sunni leaders, who chose terrorism from the start, all the so-called Sunni opposition leaders who fought the government have been through the revolving doors of Iraqi politics.
In the past, their pernicious practice was less devastating as they allowed a manageable level of terrorism inflow into their regions and they remained in charge of the local control, but their cynical behavior became self-destructive in 2014, when they allowed their regions to fall in the hands of the worst fathomable terrorist organization, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da’ish).
Once firmly in control of the Sunni Arab territories, Da’ish abolished the status of all local Sunni tribal Shaykhs and notables and forced them to pay allegiance to its own terrorist leaders, many of whom are foreign.
The only local Sunni leaders who retained their voice were those who managed to flee to Arbil (hosted by the KRG) or to neighboring Arab countries, leaving their population divided as internally displaced people living in subhuman conditions or captives in the Da’ish-controlled territories, while their provinces were turned into a war zone.
Instead of displaying any remorse for their devastating hubris, Sunni Arab leaders are still blaming everyone but themselves for what their immature political conduct brought on their community. They also still stick to their tired method of blackmail: telling Baghdad to choose their way or endless terrorism.
The Shia of Iraq are yet another contributor to the Iraqi crisis. Since 2003, the sectarian nature of Iraqi politics ascribed an exclusive clique of corrupt politicians and political parties to represent the Shia, none of whom can be accused of possessing any trace of statesmanship.
They succumbed to their corruption, creed, criminality, and complete lack of any sense of responsibility and destroyed a centuries-long legacy of rightful Shia claim to assume a leading role in governing the country as a democratic majority.
Post-2003 Shia leaders have been so incompetent, they had no idea how to become successful democrats, and when they tried to act as dictators they also failed.
The Shia community in Iraq, having taken the blame for the failure and corruption of their leaders, of which they are the primary victims, finally decided to act. In the past months, major Shia cities have been the theater of mass protests, and most recently, angry Shia protesters sacked the Green Zone twice, occupying the Parliament and the Council of Ministers buildings, as politicians fled through secret exits.
In the red zone, the rest of Iraq, headquarters of major political parties became a fashionable target of protesters. What is appalling in the behavior of Shia political leadership is that they stand in total denial and refuse to acknowledge their destructive role in the continued crisis. Instead, they accuse their Shia constituents of being Ba’thists, outlaws, and hooligans.
(*)Dr. Abbas Kadhim is an Iraqi-American academic specializes in Iraq, Iran, Persian Gulf, and Islam. He is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS- Johns Hopkins University and the President of the Institute of Shia Studies in Washington, D.C.
He earned a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Studies from the University of California, Berkeley in 2006. He is the author of Reclaiming Iraq: the 1920 Revolution and the Founding of the Modern State, Univ. of Texas Press, 2012; and “The Hawza under Siege: A Study in the Ba’th Party Archives“, Boston Univ., 2013.
Source: http://ift.tt/1tuug8W
| June 17, 2016 at 7:07 am | Categories: Current Domestic Issues, Latest Publications | URL: http://ift.tt/1tAZ2xL]
http://ift.tt/1tutDw7]
Bondlady I think this is a pretty accurate assessment according to my daily studies in Iraq news...it pretty much summed them up and basically what ive said all along. greed and power as well drives them and they care nothing for there peoples suffering ...or for Iraq as a whole..
tlm724 Thank you very much BondLady ! You are right this is an accurate assessment of the political and religious landscape that plagues Iraq. It is well written and easy to understand too.
___________
Nationally, Iraq is a federal state without a clear definition of its federalism.
Each part of Iraq interprets, and practices, federalism in any fashion it can get away with.
FYI: Federalism is a system of government in which entities such as states or provinces share power with a national government.
_________
The Kurdish leadership also use the issue of independence as a highly effective blackmail tool in their continued negotiation with Baghdad. In their entire post-2003 political participation, the Kurds showed no evidence of concern about anything happening in the rest of Iraq.
If anything, the cascade of security and political crises in the country were viewed by the Kurds as political opportunities to advance their position as a virtually independent state whose only relation with Baghdad is the 17% of the annual national budget they claim as their share.
They support their position by applying pressure on the rest of Iraq from their own region and augment that with influencing the national government’s decision by their representatives in the Iraqi Cabinet and Parliament who take part in the national decision making.
_______
Since 2003, a Sunni politician in Iraq would support the government as long as he is in a high position, but the moment he is replaced by a political process or losing an election, he would go back home, gather his armed tribesmen and declare war on the government under the banner of Sunni marginalization.
In the past, their pernicious practice was less devastating as they allowed a manageable level of terrorism inflow into their regions and they remained in charge of the local control, but their cynical behavior became self-destructive in 2014, when they allowed their regions to fall in the hands of the worst fathomable terrorist organization, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da’ish).
Instead of displaying any remorse for their devastating hubris, Sunni Arab leaders are still blaming everyone but themselves for what their immature political conduct brought on their community. They also still stick to their tired method of blackmail: telling Baghdad to choose their way or endless terrorism.
___________
The Shia of Iraq are yet another contributor to the Iraqi crisis. Since 2003, the sectarian nature of Iraqi politics ascribed an exclusive clique of corrupt politicians and political parties to represent the Shia, none of whom can be accused of possessing any trace of statesmanship.
They succumbed to their corruption, creed, criminality, and complete lack of any sense of responsibility and destroyed a centuries-long legacy of rightful Shia claim to assume a leading role in governing the country as a democratic majority. Post-2003 Shia leaders have been so incompetent, they had no idea how to become successful democrats, and when they tried to act as dictators they also failed.
The Shia community in Iraq, having taken the blame for the failure and corruption of their leaders, of which they are the primary victims, finally decided to act. In the past months, major Shia cities have been the theater of mass protests, and most recently, angry Shia protesters sacked the Green Zone twice, occupying the Parliament and the Council of Ministers buildings, as politicians fled through secret exits.
What is appalling in the behavior of Shia political leadership is that they stand in total denial and refuse to acknowledge their destructive role in the continued crisis.
http://ift.tt/1tAYXtV
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Foreign currency Iraqi dinar price on Friday, June 17, 2016
Economy Since 06.17.2016 at 08:46 (Baghdad time) BAGHDAD - balances News
http://ift.tt/1tuujSc
In so doing, they ended up creating an anemic executive institution whose chief, the Prime Minister, lacks most of the powers that allow him to govern.
Nationally, Iraq is a federal state without a clear definition of its federalism. Each part of Iraq interprets, and practices, federalism in any fashion it can get away with. The northern region, ruled independently by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was acknowledged by the new constitution as an autonomous region with the same privileges that existed before 2003, and it acquired more measures of autonomy in the past years.
By contrast, other regions are living under a de facto centralized arrangement where Baghdad decides every aspect of their local governance.
The definition of federalism in the Kurdish north, defined as a virtual independence from Baghdad, fades to levels of non-existence in the southern province, Basra, whose local governance is decided by the central government and the local politicians who are subservient to large political parties and leaders from Baghdad.
In this confused environment, national politics and the outcome of governance are decided by a simple method, corrupt political deals made under the influence of duress and blackmail.
The KRG, armed with a very effective lobbying effort and an international sympathy for the suffering of Kurds under the murderous Ba’thist regime, has managed to convince the world that the situation in Iraq has not changed after 2003. The constitutional arrangement they secured, thanks to international meddling and incompetent negotiators on the other side, allows them a great room to maneuver.
The Kurdish leadership also use the issue of independence as a highly effective blackmail tool in their continued negotiation with Baghdad. In their entire post-2003 political participation, the Kurds showed no evidence of concern about anything happening in the rest of Iraq.
If anything, the cascade of security and political crises in the country were viewed by the Kurds as political opportunities to advance their position as a virtually independent state whose only relation with Baghdad is the 17% of the annual national budget they claim as their share.
They support their position by applying pressure on the rest of Iraq from their own region and augment that with influencing the national government’s decision by their representatives in the Iraqi Cabinet and Parliament who take part in the national decision making.
The Sunni Arabs are another political entity who also use blackmail as a favorite political method. But theirs is a more lethal form of blackmail. Their political talking point is that the only alternative to a satisfactory Sunni empowerment, however unreasonably they decide that, is terrorism throughout their region.
Since losing power in Iraq, which they held almost exclusively since the creation of the modern state, The Sunni Arabs, backed and encouraged by the regional Arab states, categorically rejected a regime change that granted them their fair share as a minority in the country.
Since 2003, a Sunni politician in Iraq would support the government as long as he is in a high position, but the moment he is replaced by a political process or losing an election, he would go back home, gather his armed tribesmen and declare war on the government under the banner of Sunni marginalization.
Except for a few Sunni leaders, who chose terrorism from the start, all the so-called Sunni opposition leaders who fought the government have been through the revolving doors of Iraqi politics.
In the past, their pernicious practice was less devastating as they allowed a manageable level of terrorism inflow into their regions and they remained in charge of the local control, but their cynical behavior became self-destructive in 2014, when they allowed their regions to fall in the hands of the worst fathomable terrorist organization, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da’ish).
Once firmly in control of the Sunni Arab territories, Da’ish abolished the status of all local Sunni tribal Shaykhs and notables and forced them to pay allegiance to its own terrorist leaders, many of whom are foreign.
The only local Sunni leaders who retained their voice were those who managed to flee to Arbil (hosted by the KRG) or to neighboring Arab countries, leaving their population divided as internally displaced people living in subhuman conditions or captives in the Da’ish-controlled territories, while their provinces were turned into a war zone.
Instead of displaying any remorse for their devastating hubris, Sunni Arab leaders are still blaming everyone but themselves for what their immature political conduct brought on their community. They also still stick to their tired method of blackmail: telling Baghdad to choose their way or endless terrorism.
The Shia of Iraq are yet another contributor to the Iraqi crisis. Since 2003, the sectarian nature of Iraqi politics ascribed an exclusive clique of corrupt politicians and political parties to represent the Shia, none of whom can be accused of possessing any trace of statesmanship.
They succumbed to their corruption, creed, criminality, and complete lack of any sense of responsibility and destroyed a centuries-long legacy of rightful Shia claim to assume a leading role in governing the country as a democratic majority.
Post-2003 Shia leaders have been so incompetent, they had no idea how to become successful democrats, and when they tried to act as dictators they also failed.
The Shia community in Iraq, having taken the blame for the failure and corruption of their leaders, of which they are the primary victims, finally decided to act. In the past months, major Shia cities have been the theater of mass protests, and most recently, angry Shia protesters sacked the Green Zone twice, occupying the Parliament and the Council of Ministers buildings, as politicians fled through secret exits.
In the red zone, the rest of Iraq, headquarters of major political parties became a fashionable target of protesters. What is appalling in the behavior of Shia political leadership is that they stand in total denial and refuse to acknowledge their destructive role in the continued crisis. Instead, they accuse their Shia constituents of being Ba’thists, outlaws, and hooligans.
(*)Dr. Abbas Kadhim is an Iraqi-American academic specializes in Iraq, Iran, Persian Gulf, and Islam. He is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS- Johns Hopkins University and the President of the Institute of Shia Studies in Washington, D.C.
He earned a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Studies from the University of California, Berkeley in 2006. He is the author of Reclaiming Iraq: the 1920 Revolution and the Founding of the Modern State, Univ. of Texas Press, 2012; and “The Hawza under Siege: A Study in the Ba’th Party Archives“, Boston Univ., 2013.
Source: http://ift.tt/1tuug8W
| June 17, 2016 at 7:07 am | Categories: Current Domestic Issues, Latest Publications | URL: http://ift.tt/1tAZ2xL]
http://ift.tt/1tutDw7]
Bondlady I think this is a pretty accurate assessment according to my daily studies in Iraq news...it pretty much summed them up and basically what ive said all along. greed and power as well drives them and they care nothing for there peoples suffering ...or for Iraq as a whole..
tlm724 Thank you very much BondLady ! You are right this is an accurate assessment of the political and religious landscape that plagues Iraq. It is well written and easy to understand too.
___________
Nationally, Iraq is a federal state without a clear definition of its federalism.
Each part of Iraq interprets, and practices, federalism in any fashion it can get away with.
FYI: Federalism is a system of government in which entities such as states or provinces share power with a national government.
_________
The Kurdish leadership also use the issue of independence as a highly effective blackmail tool in their continued negotiation with Baghdad. In their entire post-2003 political participation, the Kurds showed no evidence of concern about anything happening in the rest of Iraq.
If anything, the cascade of security and political crises in the country were viewed by the Kurds as political opportunities to advance their position as a virtually independent state whose only relation with Baghdad is the 17% of the annual national budget they claim as their share.
They support their position by applying pressure on the rest of Iraq from their own region and augment that with influencing the national government’s decision by their representatives in the Iraqi Cabinet and Parliament who take part in the national decision making.
_______
Since 2003, a Sunni politician in Iraq would support the government as long as he is in a high position, but the moment he is replaced by a political process or losing an election, he would go back home, gather his armed tribesmen and declare war on the government under the banner of Sunni marginalization.
In the past, their pernicious practice was less devastating as they allowed a manageable level of terrorism inflow into their regions and they remained in charge of the local control, but their cynical behavior became self-destructive in 2014, when they allowed their regions to fall in the hands of the worst fathomable terrorist organization, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da’ish).
Instead of displaying any remorse for their devastating hubris, Sunni Arab leaders are still blaming everyone but themselves for what their immature political conduct brought on their community. They also still stick to their tired method of blackmail: telling Baghdad to choose their way or endless terrorism.
___________
The Shia of Iraq are yet another contributor to the Iraqi crisis. Since 2003, the sectarian nature of Iraqi politics ascribed an exclusive clique of corrupt politicians and political parties to represent the Shia, none of whom can be accused of possessing any trace of statesmanship.
They succumbed to their corruption, creed, criminality, and complete lack of any sense of responsibility and destroyed a centuries-long legacy of rightful Shia claim to assume a leading role in governing the country as a democratic majority. Post-2003 Shia leaders have been so incompetent, they had no idea how to become successful democrats, and when they tried to act as dictators they also failed.
The Shia community in Iraq, having taken the blame for the failure and corruption of their leaders, of which they are the primary victims, finally decided to act. In the past months, major Shia cities have been the theater of mass protests, and most recently, angry Shia protesters sacked the Green Zone twice, occupying the Parliament and the Council of Ministers buildings, as politicians fled through secret exits.
What is appalling in the behavior of Shia political leadership is that they stand in total denial and refuse to acknowledge their destructive role in the continued crisis.
http://ift.tt/1tAYXtV
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Foreign currency Iraqi dinar price on Friday, June 17, 2016
Economy Since 06.17.2016 at 08:46 (Baghdad time) BAGHDAD - balances News
http://ift.tt/1tuujSc
US dollar of US $ 1 = 1,161.7500 Iraqi dinars
1 Iraqi dinars = US $ 0.0009
Euro 1 euro = 1,310.5114 Iraqi dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0008 euros
Sterling
IQD 1 = 0.0006 pounds
The Canadian dollar CAD $ 1 = 898.7004 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0011 Canadian dollars
Australian Dollar AUD 1 = 858.4190 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0012 Australian dollars
Japanese Yen 1 JPY = 11.1567 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0896 Japanese yen
LINK
tlm724 their back (Suspect)
June 17, 2016
Rates of foreign currencies compared to the Iraqi dinar
BAGHDAD - A Journal
You progress (Il Giornale), exchange rates as we have received from the Iraqi market to sell the currency.
US dollar of US $ 1 = 1,161.7500 Iraqi dinars
1 Iraqi dinars = US $ 0.0009
Euro 1 euro = 1,310.5114 Iraqi dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0008 euros
Sterling £ 1 = 1,646.8959 Iraqi dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0006 pounds
The Canadian dollar CAD $ 1 = 898.7004 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0011 Canadian dollars
Australian Dollar AUD 1 = 858.4190 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0012 Australian dollars
Japanese Yen 1 JPY = 11.1567 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0896 Japanese yen
LINK
tlm724 MOF June 17, 2016 1169.2500
http://ift.tt/1tuu7T3
http://ift.tt/1xpGwCi
http://ift.tt/1tutY1W
1 Iraqi dinars = US $ 0.0009
Euro 1 euro = 1,310.5114 Iraqi dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0008 euros
Sterling
IQD 1 = 0.0006 pounds
The Canadian dollar CAD $ 1 = 898.7004 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0011 Canadian dollars
Australian Dollar AUD 1 = 858.4190 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0012 Australian dollars
Japanese Yen 1 JPY = 11.1567 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0896 Japanese yen
LINK
tlm724 their back (Suspect)
June 17, 2016
Rates of foreign currencies compared to the Iraqi dinar
BAGHDAD - A Journal
You progress (Il Giornale), exchange rates as we have received from the Iraqi market to sell the currency.
US dollar of US $ 1 = 1,161.7500 Iraqi dinars
1 Iraqi dinars = US $ 0.0009
Euro 1 euro = 1,310.5114 Iraqi dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0008 euros
Sterling £ 1 = 1,646.8959 Iraqi dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0006 pounds
The Canadian dollar CAD $ 1 = 898.7004 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0011 Canadian dollars
Australian Dollar AUD 1 = 858.4190 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0012 Australian dollars
Japanese Yen 1 JPY = 11.1567 dinars
IQD 1 = 0.0896 Japanese yen
LINK
tlm724 MOF June 17, 2016 1169.2500
http://ift.tt/1tuu7T3
http://ift.tt/1xpGwCi
http://ift.tt/1tutY1W
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: Barzani opinion dividing Iraq does not represent all of the Kurdistan region
June 17, 2016 12:08 Counting the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan ( PUK ) , led by former President Jalal Talabani, the security of the province council adviser Kurdistan Barzani opinion on the necessity to divide Iraq after the defeat of Daash gangs terrorist as "only reflects the opinion of a political party in the Kurdistan region."
The MP said the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Xuan Daoudi told I followed news agency Buratha "now the region is not uniform , and the mechanism of decision it is not like before , because the legitimate institutions in the region Off this view is in Iraq 's future is not all the region a political party , " pointing to "the existence of perspectives discussed within Iraq and not within the region only."
the "true after Daash change administrative map in Iraq because there are new benefits on the ground and there is no new differences and areas should be rehabilitated , not only the infrastructure, but Rehabilitation population as well, and will be drawing new administrative boundaries of the realms disputed areas , " stressing " We must head into regionalization Iraq Kvdralah or confederation. "
he was pleased with Barzani , the security of the Kurdistan Regional Council adviser is the eldest son of the region 's president , Massoud Barzani , said Wednesday he was " once defeat al Daash must divide Iraq into three separate entities for the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds to prevent further bloodshed "he said.
he added an interview with Reuters, in Erbil, said that" lack of confidence reached a level not allowed by remaining [Iraqis] under one roof , "Mushir to, that" federalism did not work and therefore either a confederation or full secession, if we have three confederated states we will have three capitals of equal not above the one on the other. "
he said Barzani happy" to be granted , the year the same option in the provinces , which represent the majority in northern and western Iraq , "adding," what we are introducing is the solution, this does not mean to live under one roof but it is possible to share a good neighborliness, once you feel comfortable because they have a bright future and a safe can begin to cooperate with each other. "
the head of the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, said in a letter to him on 16 of last may to mark the 100 - year anniversary of the Sykes Pico, that " the Sykes - Picot agreement is dead, and we decide our fate, either to stay on partnership with Iraq, or to be good neighbors."
http://ift.tt/1tuu0XE
tlm724 the head of the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, said in a letter to him on 16 of last may to mark the 100 - year anniversary of the Sykes Pico, that " the Sykes - Picot agreement is dead, and we decide our fate, either to stay on partnership with Iraq, or to be good neighbors."
_________
June 17, 2016 12:08 Counting the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan ( PUK ) , led by former President Jalal Talabani, the security of the province council adviser Kurdistan Barzani opinion on the necessity to divide Iraq after the defeat of Daash gangs terrorist as "only reflects the opinion of a political party in the Kurdistan region."
The MP said the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Xuan Daoudi told I followed news agency Buratha "now the region is not uniform , and the mechanism of decision it is not like before , because the legitimate institutions in the region Off this view is in Iraq 's future is not all the region a political party , " pointing to "the existence of perspectives discussed within Iraq and not within the region only."
the "true after Daash change administrative map in Iraq because there are new benefits on the ground and there is no new differences and areas should be rehabilitated , not only the infrastructure, but Rehabilitation population as well, and will be drawing new administrative boundaries of the realms disputed areas , " stressing " We must head into regionalization Iraq Kvdralah or confederation. "
he was pleased with Barzani , the security of the Kurdistan Regional Council adviser is the eldest son of the region 's president , Massoud Barzani , said Wednesday he was " once defeat al Daash must divide Iraq into three separate entities for the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds to prevent further bloodshed "he said.
he added an interview with Reuters, in Erbil, said that" lack of confidence reached a level not allowed by remaining [Iraqis] under one roof , "Mushir to, that" federalism did not work and therefore either a confederation or full secession, if we have three confederated states we will have three capitals of equal not above the one on the other. "
he said Barzani happy" to be granted , the year the same option in the provinces , which represent the majority in northern and western Iraq , "adding," what we are introducing is the solution, this does not mean to live under one roof but it is possible to share a good neighborliness, once you feel comfortable because they have a bright future and a safe can begin to cooperate with each other. "
the head of the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, said in a letter to him on 16 of last may to mark the 100 - year anniversary of the Sykes Pico, that " the Sykes - Picot agreement is dead, and we decide our fate, either to stay on partnership with Iraq, or to be good neighbors."
http://ift.tt/1tuu0XE
tlm724 the head of the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, said in a letter to him on 16 of last may to mark the 100 - year anniversary of the Sykes Pico, that " the Sykes - Picot agreement is dead, and we decide our fate, either to stay on partnership with Iraq, or to be good neighbors."
_________
How the Sykes-Picot Agreement Helped Make a Messed-Up Middle East
Ian Bremmer @ianbremmer May 18, 2016
The 100th anniversary of the Sykes-Picot agreement comes on May 19, marking a century that helped shaped the Middle East
May 19 marks the 100-year anniversary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, signed by diplomats Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot to help Britain and France divide the lands of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. Sykes-Picot began to set the boundaries of what became countries like Iraq and Syria—and that’s been tragic for their citizens.
In the past half century, Iraq has passed from decades of Sunni dominance under Saddam Hussein through a war with Iran, a war with the U.S., years of sanctions, another war with the U.S., a Shiʻite-dominated government, a Sunni insurgency and general misrule. Oil is flowing again, offering hope that political progress might finally bring lasting economic gains. But for now, the political dysfunction and violence continue.
Before its civil war began, Syria was home to 22 million people. More than half of those people have been forced from their homes. Some 470,000 have been killed, 4.8 million have fled the country, and another 6.5 million are internally displaced. The country’s economy is less than half its prewar size.
Kurds remain the world’s largest stateless minority. About 30 million live within Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, though there are significant cultural and linguistic differences. Iraq’s Kurds inch their way toward independence, while the Kurds of Syria are fighting both President Bashar Assad and ISIS.
In Turkey, Kurds are divided between those who want an active role in Turkish politics and others who want independence. The only force engaged in a bid to create new borders in the region is ISIS, which is losing ground in its bid to establish its caliphate.
Sykes and Picot aren’t fully to blame for today’s instability. It’s not as if borders carefully drawn by locals with greater sensitivity to ethnic, religious and linguistic differences could have secured a stable Middle East after the Ottomans.
Could new borders ease today’s conflicts? We won’t find out soon, because no one in the region can agree where they should fall. Outsiders can play a role in forming a solution, but they can’t impose one.
Yet access to modern tools of communication ensures that borders will eventually appear on their own, created from the political and cultural affinities that bring people together in the virtual world. Translating those borders into internationally recognized boundaries that delineate nations will produce more turmoil in the short term, but the result will be far more durable than diplomats or demographers could devise.
This appears in the May 30, 2016 issue of TIME.
http://ift.tt/1W38Trp
http://ift.tt/1tuutZV
Ian Bremmer @ianbremmer May 18, 2016
The 100th anniversary of the Sykes-Picot agreement comes on May 19, marking a century that helped shaped the Middle East
May 19 marks the 100-year anniversary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, signed by diplomats Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot to help Britain and France divide the lands of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. Sykes-Picot began to set the boundaries of what became countries like Iraq and Syria—and that’s been tragic for their citizens.
In the past half century, Iraq has passed from decades of Sunni dominance under Saddam Hussein through a war with Iran, a war with the U.S., years of sanctions, another war with the U.S., a Shiʻite-dominated government, a Sunni insurgency and general misrule. Oil is flowing again, offering hope that political progress might finally bring lasting economic gains. But for now, the political dysfunction and violence continue.
Before its civil war began, Syria was home to 22 million people. More than half of those people have been forced from their homes. Some 470,000 have been killed, 4.8 million have fled the country, and another 6.5 million are internally displaced. The country’s economy is less than half its prewar size.
Kurds remain the world’s largest stateless minority. About 30 million live within Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, though there are significant cultural and linguistic differences. Iraq’s Kurds inch their way toward independence, while the Kurds of Syria are fighting both President Bashar Assad and ISIS.
In Turkey, Kurds are divided between those who want an active role in Turkish politics and others who want independence. The only force engaged in a bid to create new borders in the region is ISIS, which is losing ground in its bid to establish its caliphate.
Sykes and Picot aren’t fully to blame for today’s instability. It’s not as if borders carefully drawn by locals with greater sensitivity to ethnic, religious and linguistic differences could have secured a stable Middle East after the Ottomans.
Could new borders ease today’s conflicts? We won’t find out soon, because no one in the region can agree where they should fall. Outsiders can play a role in forming a solution, but they can’t impose one.
Yet access to modern tools of communication ensures that borders will eventually appear on their own, created from the political and cultural affinities that bring people together in the virtual world. Translating those borders into internationally recognized boundaries that delineate nations will produce more turmoil in the short term, but the result will be far more durable than diplomats or demographers could devise.
This appears in the May 30, 2016 issue of TIME.
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