The Role of an Asian Currency Unit for Asian Monetary Integration Part 1 of 2
Masahiro Kawai -- Dean and CEO, Asian Development Bank Institute
In recent years East Asia has seen rapid advances in market-driven economic integration through cross-border trade, investment and finance.
In this paper, East Asia includes the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), the newly industrialized economies (NIEs; Hong Kong, Korea, Taipei, China and Singapore), and Japan.
China is the most recent participant in this integration process as a result of further opening its economy to international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Growing economic integration has strengthened macro-economic links across those East Asian economies that have also opened financial markets and liberalized capital accounts.
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Masahiro Kawai -- Dean and CEO, Asian Development Bank Institute
In recent years East Asia has seen rapid advances in market-driven economic integration through cross-border trade, investment and finance.
In this paper, East Asia includes the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), the newly industrialized economies (NIEs; Hong Kong, Korea, Taipei, China and Singapore), and Japan.
China is the most recent participant in this integration process as a result of further opening its economy to international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Growing economic integration has strengthened macro-economic links across those East Asian economies that have also opened financial markets and liberalized capital accounts.
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The high and rising degree of economic interdependence in East Asia suggests that it is increasingly important for the region’s economies to achieve intra-regional exchange rate stability.
Some recent key policymakers in East Asia are becoming vocal about the advisability of creating a monetary union in the region (see for example De Ocampo, 2004; Kuroda, 2004; and Chino, 2004).
The reason is that they believe that intra-regional exchange rate stability is desirable for East Asia and that forming a monetary union is the best way to achieve it. In reality, however, the region remains characterized by diverse, uncoordinated exchange rate arrangements.
A Heterogeneous Region
As it is increasingly difficult to maintain intra-regional exchange rate stability through the traditional policy of US dollar pegs, a new framework for exchange rate policy coordination should be developed in East Asia. In particular, given the relative decline in the role of the US dollar and the absence of a dominant single East Asian currency, a case can be made for introducing a basket of regional currencies - called the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) - as the region’s common reference currency.
Deep market integration and rising economic interdependence in East Asia suggests that the region is emerging as one that satisfies optimum currency area (OCA) conditions.
One of the lessons from European monetary integration leading up to the introduction of the euro in 1999, and the accession of new member states to the European Union (EU) and the euro zone in the subsequent period, is that macro-economic and structural convergence is critical if a group of economies is to form, or join, a common currency area as equal (or symmetric) partners.
Macro-economic convergence criteria were explicitly embedded into the Maastricht Treaty and must be met when a new EU member state joins the euro zone. The need for structural convergence has also been made explicit for countries considering EU accession - well before the decision is made whether they can join the euro zone.
Is East Asia An OCA? (Optimum Currency Area)
According to the theory of optimum currency areas developed by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), a currency area is optimum - that is, the member economies are better off adopting permanently fixed exchange rates with each other, or forming a joint currency area - under the following conditions:
Openness to the area members;
Integration of product, factor and financial markets;
Symmetry of shocks affecting the area members;
Similarity of preferences over output-inflation tradeoffs; and
Willingness to coordinate supporting policies such as fiscal policies.
These are often called the OCA criteria. The consensus among experts on the applicability of OCA criteria in East Asia is that this region as a whole may not be an optimum currency area, but several sub-groups of the region’s economies may form such currency areas (see Watanabe and Ogura, 2006).
For example, although China and low-income ASEAN economies are deepening their economic integration with other East Asian economies in terms of trade and FDI, they have yet to open their capital accounts and integrate themselves fully with other East Asian economies.
Nonetheless, several economies in the region are well-integrated with each other in terms of trade, investment, finance and macro-economic activity.
For example, Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei could form a currency area today without much of an economic problem, as could Japan and Korea. The view that OCA criteria are endogenous, would suggest that once these economies peg the exchange rates to each other or form a monetary union, economic integration will further deepen and the degree of symmetry of supply shocks will rise. But this view is now being challenged by the financial crisis in the euro zone.
Given the long-run trends of rising economic integration in East Asia, more OCA conditions are likely to be satisfied over time.
From this perspective, Mundell (2005) argues that there are many benefits from Asian monetary integration, including:
a greater trade and investment;
a wider range of alternatives for countries forced out of the US dollar area;
a stronger voice in world affairs;
a more effective cushion in crises;
a reduction, perhaps even an elimination, of exchange rate conflict;
better monetary policy;
reduced destabilizing speculation;
more cohesive regional decision-making; and
a more efficient Asian economy.
Macro-economic convergence
Strictly speaking, macro-economic convergence among economies is not part of the OCA criteria; it is not a prerequisite for a single currency area. For example, in the case of a unilateral or asymmetric currency peg, ex-ante macro-economic convergence is not a prerequisite - although a successful peg would eventually require a certain degree of ex-post macro-economic convergence.
Nonetheless, a high degree of ex-ante macro-economic convergence is critical to success once countries decide to form or join a single currency area as equal or symmetric partners, as in the case of the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe.
The reason is that without macro-economic convergence, it will be difficult for a group of economies experiencing differential inflation rates and fiscal deficits to gain from a common, non-inflationary monetary policy.
This is one important reason why the Maastricht convergence criteria - standards for inflation rates, interest rates, fiscal deficits, public debt and exchange rate stability - were introduced in the early 1990s in order to encourage European Monetary System (EMS) countries to achieve convergence of monetary and fiscal conditions before they became eligible for EMU membership.
Box 1: Ex-ante or ex-post macro-economic convergence?
A country suffering from high inflation can unilaterally peg its exchange rate to the currency of a low, stable inflation country so that the pegging country can import the low and stable inflation policy from the anchor country.
This was one of the reasons for a high inflation country - like Italy - joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), as this allowed the country to import the Bundesbank’s non-inflationary monetary policy through currency pegging to the deutschmark.
The reason the ERM (or the earlier Snake) did not require ex-ante macro-economic convergence was that there was perhaps an implicit assumption that Germany would provide a stable anchor currency and other countries would stabilize their currencies against the deutschmark, thereby importing non-inflationary policy from Germany. This may explain why the ERM functioned as an asymmetric exchange rate system, despite the fact that it was designed initially as a symmetric arrangement.
Looking at the data on East Asian economies for major macro-economic indicators - those considered for the Maastricht convergence criteria - it is clear that the region has not achieved sufficient macro-economic convergence in terms of inflation rates, interest rates, fiscal deficits and fiscal debt. There is no exchange rate stabilization mechanism in the region.
Structural Reform Is Needed
Structural convergence - in such areas as industrial structure, financial sector development, capital account openness, and the quality of institutional and policy frameworks - is not part of OCA criteria, and was never part of the Maastricht convergence criteria.
So, while a country would not have to have strong economic structures or institutional foundations - and, hence, would most likely be without sound macro-economic policy institutions such as a credible, independent central bank and a disciplined fiscal authority - before forming or joining a currency area, it could still unilaterally peg its exchange rate to the currency of a country with strong structures and institutions. By so doing, that country could rely on, and effectively import, the strong economic infrastructure of the target-currency country.
During the recent negotiations of EU accession of Central and Eastern European countries as well as some former Soviet Republics, these candidate countries have always been required to implement structural reforms and various liberalization measures in order to improve the quality of policy and institutional frameworks. Once admitted to the EU, new member states can be considered as candidates to join the euro zone. ‘
The idea here is that to become a full (and symmetric) member of the euro zone, each candidate country must first improve the quality of economic structures and institutions so that the country becomes similar structurally to those in the EU, and then demonstrate a sufficient degree of macro-economic convergence vis-à-vis incumbent countries before it becomes eligible to join the euro zone.
Given that its economies exhibit wide differentials in per-capita incomes, industrial structures, institutional quality and various types of market infrastructure, East Asia has not achieved a high degree of structural convergence.
For the developing and emerging economies in East Asia, the first priority toward forming or joining a currency area would be to pursue policy, institutional and structural reforms so as to strengthen domestic economic and structural fundamentals, and improve institutional quality. Without these fundamental efforts, a meaningful structural convergence would not be achieved.
Box 2: A collective currency appreciation policy
Abrupt changes in international investor tolerance (or expectations) could put significant downward pressure on the US dollar. A loss of confidence in the US economy due to the likely stagnant economic conditions and mounting public debt could trigger a portfolio shift away from US dollar assets to other currencies.
In the medium-term East Asia will probably face another surge of short-term capital inflows and the consequent upward pressure on currency values, given that East Asia is the first region to recover from the global financial and economic crisis, and will likely face rising interest rates - whether policy rates or market rates - in the coming quarters.
These capital inflows are often directed to asset markets - for investment in equities and real property - and hence, if not managed properly, can be a source of macro-economic and financial sector vulnerabilities.
Adopting a policy that would allow currency appreciation is advisable in the presence of domestic inflationary pressure and incipient asset price bubbles, but such a policy could also damage a country’s international price competitiveness vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. So these problems may be difficult for a country to resolve through individual national policies alone.
However, in this instance, a most reasonable and effective policy option would be to allow ‘collective’ currency appreciation across the region, which does not differentially affect individual countries’ relative price competitiveness.
A collective currency appreciation policy would spread the adjustment cost across East Asia, thus minimizing individual country costs. A simple calculation would indicate that a 20% collective appreciation of East Asian currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar implies only a 9% effective (or trade-weighted) appreciation against trading partners - given the intra-regional trade share of 55% - even if all other non-East Asian currencies remain stable vis-à-vis the dollar.
To the extent that other currencies also appreciate vis-à-vis the dollar, the degree of effective appreciation of the East Asian currencies would be more limited.
Some recent key policymakers in East Asia are becoming vocal about the advisability of creating a monetary union in the region (see for example De Ocampo, 2004; Kuroda, 2004; and Chino, 2004).
The reason is that they believe that intra-regional exchange rate stability is desirable for East Asia and that forming a monetary union is the best way to achieve it. In reality, however, the region remains characterized by diverse, uncoordinated exchange rate arrangements.
A Heterogeneous Region
As it is increasingly difficult to maintain intra-regional exchange rate stability through the traditional policy of US dollar pegs, a new framework for exchange rate policy coordination should be developed in East Asia. In particular, given the relative decline in the role of the US dollar and the absence of a dominant single East Asian currency, a case can be made for introducing a basket of regional currencies - called the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) - as the region’s common reference currency.
Deep market integration and rising economic interdependence in East Asia suggests that the region is emerging as one that satisfies optimum currency area (OCA) conditions.
One of the lessons from European monetary integration leading up to the introduction of the euro in 1999, and the accession of new member states to the European Union (EU) and the euro zone in the subsequent period, is that macro-economic and structural convergence is critical if a group of economies is to form, or join, a common currency area as equal (or symmetric) partners.
Macro-economic convergence criteria were explicitly embedded into the Maastricht Treaty and must be met when a new EU member state joins the euro zone. The need for structural convergence has also been made explicit for countries considering EU accession - well before the decision is made whether they can join the euro zone.
Is East Asia An OCA? (Optimum Currency Area)
According to the theory of optimum currency areas developed by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), a currency area is optimum - that is, the member economies are better off adopting permanently fixed exchange rates with each other, or forming a joint currency area - under the following conditions:
Openness to the area members;
Integration of product, factor and financial markets;
Symmetry of shocks affecting the area members;
Similarity of preferences over output-inflation tradeoffs; and
Willingness to coordinate supporting policies such as fiscal policies.
These are often called the OCA criteria. The consensus among experts on the applicability of OCA criteria in East Asia is that this region as a whole may not be an optimum currency area, but several sub-groups of the region’s economies may form such currency areas (see Watanabe and Ogura, 2006).
For example, although China and low-income ASEAN economies are deepening their economic integration with other East Asian economies in terms of trade and FDI, they have yet to open their capital accounts and integrate themselves fully with other East Asian economies.
Nonetheless, several economies in the region are well-integrated with each other in terms of trade, investment, finance and macro-economic activity.
For example, Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei could form a currency area today without much of an economic problem, as could Japan and Korea. The view that OCA criteria are endogenous, would suggest that once these economies peg the exchange rates to each other or form a monetary union, economic integration will further deepen and the degree of symmetry of supply shocks will rise. But this view is now being challenged by the financial crisis in the euro zone.
Given the long-run trends of rising economic integration in East Asia, more OCA conditions are likely to be satisfied over time.
From this perspective, Mundell (2005) argues that there are many benefits from Asian monetary integration, including:
a greater trade and investment;
a wider range of alternatives for countries forced out of the US dollar area;
a stronger voice in world affairs;
a more effective cushion in crises;
a reduction, perhaps even an elimination, of exchange rate conflict;
better monetary policy;
reduced destabilizing speculation;
more cohesive regional decision-making; and
a more efficient Asian economy.
Macro-economic convergence
Strictly speaking, macro-economic convergence among economies is not part of the OCA criteria; it is not a prerequisite for a single currency area. For example, in the case of a unilateral or asymmetric currency peg, ex-ante macro-economic convergence is not a prerequisite - although a successful peg would eventually require a certain degree of ex-post macro-economic convergence.
Nonetheless, a high degree of ex-ante macro-economic convergence is critical to success once countries decide to form or join a single currency area as equal or symmetric partners, as in the case of the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe.
The reason is that without macro-economic convergence, it will be difficult for a group of economies experiencing differential inflation rates and fiscal deficits to gain from a common, non-inflationary monetary policy.
This is one important reason why the Maastricht convergence criteria - standards for inflation rates, interest rates, fiscal deficits, public debt and exchange rate stability - were introduced in the early 1990s in order to encourage European Monetary System (EMS) countries to achieve convergence of monetary and fiscal conditions before they became eligible for EMU membership.
Box 1: Ex-ante or ex-post macro-economic convergence?
A country suffering from high inflation can unilaterally peg its exchange rate to the currency of a low, stable inflation country so that the pegging country can import the low and stable inflation policy from the anchor country.
This was one of the reasons for a high inflation country - like Italy - joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), as this allowed the country to import the Bundesbank’s non-inflationary monetary policy through currency pegging to the deutschmark.
The reason the ERM (or the earlier Snake) did not require ex-ante macro-economic convergence was that there was perhaps an implicit assumption that Germany would provide a stable anchor currency and other countries would stabilize their currencies against the deutschmark, thereby importing non-inflationary policy from Germany. This may explain why the ERM functioned as an asymmetric exchange rate system, despite the fact that it was designed initially as a symmetric arrangement.
Looking at the data on East Asian economies for major macro-economic indicators - those considered for the Maastricht convergence criteria - it is clear that the region has not achieved sufficient macro-economic convergence in terms of inflation rates, interest rates, fiscal deficits and fiscal debt. There is no exchange rate stabilization mechanism in the region.
Structural Reform Is Needed
Structural convergence - in such areas as industrial structure, financial sector development, capital account openness, and the quality of institutional and policy frameworks - is not part of OCA criteria, and was never part of the Maastricht convergence criteria.
So, while a country would not have to have strong economic structures or institutional foundations - and, hence, would most likely be without sound macro-economic policy institutions such as a credible, independent central bank and a disciplined fiscal authority - before forming or joining a currency area, it could still unilaterally peg its exchange rate to the currency of a country with strong structures and institutions. By so doing, that country could rely on, and effectively import, the strong economic infrastructure of the target-currency country.
During the recent negotiations of EU accession of Central and Eastern European countries as well as some former Soviet Republics, these candidate countries have always been required to implement structural reforms and various liberalization measures in order to improve the quality of policy and institutional frameworks. Once admitted to the EU, new member states can be considered as candidates to join the euro zone. ‘
The idea here is that to become a full (and symmetric) member of the euro zone, each candidate country must first improve the quality of economic structures and institutions so that the country becomes similar structurally to those in the EU, and then demonstrate a sufficient degree of macro-economic convergence vis-à-vis incumbent countries before it becomes eligible to join the euro zone.
Given that its economies exhibit wide differentials in per-capita incomes, industrial structures, institutional quality and various types of market infrastructure, East Asia has not achieved a high degree of structural convergence.
For the developing and emerging economies in East Asia, the first priority toward forming or joining a currency area would be to pursue policy, institutional and structural reforms so as to strengthen domestic economic and structural fundamentals, and improve institutional quality. Without these fundamental efforts, a meaningful structural convergence would not be achieved.
Box 2: A collective currency appreciation policy
Abrupt changes in international investor tolerance (or expectations) could put significant downward pressure on the US dollar. A loss of confidence in the US economy due to the likely stagnant economic conditions and mounting public debt could trigger a portfolio shift away from US dollar assets to other currencies.
In the medium-term East Asia will probably face another surge of short-term capital inflows and the consequent upward pressure on currency values, given that East Asia is the first region to recover from the global financial and economic crisis, and will likely face rising interest rates - whether policy rates or market rates - in the coming quarters.
These capital inflows are often directed to asset markets - for investment in equities and real property - and hence, if not managed properly, can be a source of macro-economic and financial sector vulnerabilities.
Adopting a policy that would allow currency appreciation is advisable in the presence of domestic inflationary pressure and incipient asset price bubbles, but such a policy could also damage a country’s international price competitiveness vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. So these problems may be difficult for a country to resolve through individual national policies alone.
However, in this instance, a most reasonable and effective policy option would be to allow ‘collective’ currency appreciation across the region, which does not differentially affect individual countries’ relative price competitiveness.
A collective currency appreciation policy would spread the adjustment cost across East Asia, thus minimizing individual country costs. A simple calculation would indicate that a 20% collective appreciation of East Asian currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar implies only a 9% effective (or trade-weighted) appreciation against trading partners - given the intra-regional trade share of 55% - even if all other non-East Asian currencies remain stable vis-à-vis the dollar.
To the extent that other currencies also appreciate vis-à-vis the dollar, the degree of effective appreciation of the East Asian currencies would be more limited.
Any agreement adopting a joint currency appreciation policy would require a convergence of exchange rate regimes in East Asia to promote intraregional exchange rate stability. To achieve this, the existing policy dialogue processes among the region’s finance ministers and central bank governors would play a critical role.
Clearly the first step toward policy coordination would be to adopt exchange rate regimes that allow greater currency flexibility vis-à-vis the US dollar. China’s yuan revaluation in July 2005 and its shift to a managed crawling peg - followed by Malaysia’s similar shift to a managed float - potentially marked the beginning of such coordination.
The scale of interdependence among East Asian economies has risen to a level almost matching that in Europe - at least Europe of the 1980s-90s. Given the heightened interdependence of economies in the region, East Asian countries should arguably aim to stabilize intraregional exchange rates through policy coordination rather than seek stability through a US dollar peg.
The ultimate goal in this plan could be the creation of an Asian common currency. However, the problem is that no exchange rate policy coordination has taken place in East Asia. Even worse, the region’s exchange rate regimes are quite diverse and in serious disarray (Kawai, 2008).
In contrast to the pre-crisis period, where many emerging market economies in East Asia maintained de jure or de facto US dollar pegged regimes, the post-crisis period exhibits a greater diversity in exchange rate regimes.
The two giant economies in the region, Japan and China, adopt different exchange rate regimes - Japan a free float and China a heavily managed, crawling peg regime anchored by the US dollar. Other economies - except for the small open economies of Hong Kong and Brunei - adopt intermediate managed float regimes with the US dollar as the most important anchor currency.
Comments may be made at the end of Part 2 Thank You
Clearly the first step toward policy coordination would be to adopt exchange rate regimes that allow greater currency flexibility vis-à-vis the US dollar. China’s yuan revaluation in July 2005 and its shift to a managed crawling peg - followed by Malaysia’s similar shift to a managed float - potentially marked the beginning of such coordination.
The scale of interdependence among East Asian economies has risen to a level almost matching that in Europe - at least Europe of the 1980s-90s. Given the heightened interdependence of economies in the region, East Asian countries should arguably aim to stabilize intraregional exchange rates through policy coordination rather than seek stability through a US dollar peg.
The ultimate goal in this plan could be the creation of an Asian common currency. However, the problem is that no exchange rate policy coordination has taken place in East Asia. Even worse, the region’s exchange rate regimes are quite diverse and in serious disarray (Kawai, 2008).
In contrast to the pre-crisis period, where many emerging market economies in East Asia maintained de jure or de facto US dollar pegged regimes, the post-crisis period exhibits a greater diversity in exchange rate regimes.
The two giant economies in the region, Japan and China, adopt different exchange rate regimes - Japan a free float and China a heavily managed, crawling peg regime anchored by the US dollar. Other economies - except for the small open economies of Hong Kong and Brunei - adopt intermediate managed float regimes with the US dollar as the most important anchor currency.
Comments may be made at the end of Part 2 Thank You
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